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C Y N T H I A  E S T L U N D  
What Should We Do After Work?  
Automation and Employment Law 
abstract.  Will advances in robotics, artiﬁcial intelligence, and machine learning put vast 
swaths of the labor force out of work or into ﬁerce competition for the jobs that remain? Or, as in 
the past, will new jobs absorb workers displaced by automation? These hotly debated questions 
have profound implications for the fortress of rights and beneﬁts that has been constructed on the 
foundation of the employment relationship. This Article charts a path for reforming that body of 
law in the face of justiﬁed anxiety and uncertainty about the future impact of automation on jobs. 
 Many of the forces that drive automation—including law-related labor costs—also drive ﬁrms’ 
decisions about “ﬁssuring,” or replacing employees with outside contractors. Fissuring has already 
transformed the landscape of work and contributed to weaker labor standards and growing in-
equality. A sensible response to automation should have in mind this adjacent problem, and vice 
versa. Unfortunately, the dominant legal responses to ﬁssuring—which aim to extend ﬁrms’ legal 
responsibility for the workers whose labor they rely on—do not meet the distinctive challenge of 
automation, and even modestly exacerbate it. Automation offers the ultimate exit from the costs 
and risks associated with human labor. As technology becomes an ever-more-capable and cost-
effective substitute for human workers, it enables ﬁrms to circumvent prevailing legal strategies 
for protecting workers and shoring up the fortress of employment. 
 The question is how to protect workers’ rights and entitlements while reducing ﬁrms’ incen-
tive both to replace employees with contractors and to replace human workers with machines. The 
answer, I argue, begins with separating the issue of what workers’ entitlements should be from the 
issue of where their economic burdens should fall. Some worker rights and entitlements neces-
sarily entail employer duties and burdens. But for those that do not, we should look for ways to 
shift their costs off of employer payrolls or to extend the entitlements themselves beyond employ-
ment. The existing fortress of employment-based rights and beneﬁts is under assault from ﬁssur-
ing and automation; it is failing to protect those who remain outside its walls and erecting barriers 
to some who seek to enter. We should dismantle some of its fortiﬁcations and construct in its place 
a broader foundation of economic security for all, including those who cannot or do not make their 
living through steady employment.  
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introduction 
Three major threats to American jobs have grabbed headlines in recent years. 
One is the migration of manufacturing jobs to China, as perhaps best exempli-
ﬁed by Foxconn, the Taiwanese ﬁrm that employs over a million Chinese work-
ers in the production of iPhones, iPads, and other consumer electronics. To la-
bor-law cognoscenti, the outsourcing of manufacturing to China, and the feared 
“race to the bottom” in labor standards, is mostly yesterday’s news. Since 2015, 
they have been more preoccupied with a second development—the rise of plat-
form-based “gig” work in place of real jobs, epitomized by Uber’s treatment of 
its drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. 
Yet both of these threats to American jobs and workers arguably pale beside 
the threat of automation. If Uber has its way, its drivers will soon go the way of 
lamplighters, replaced by self-driving vehicles.
1
 And if Foxconn is representa-
tive, then Chinese factory jobs are also at risk: by 2016, Foxconn had replaced 
60,000 production workers with robots and was planning to replace most of the 
others within several years.
2
 
For some observers, Uber’s autonomous vehicles and Foxconn’s robots are 
harbingers of a jobless future, as machines and algorithms threaten to put vast 
swaths of the labor force in the United States and worldwide out of work or into 
desperate competition for the jobs that remain.
3
 These commentators describe 
an exponential growth of technologies that replicate or surpass humans in an 
 
1. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Autonomous Vehicles Could Cost America 5 Million Jobs. What 
Should We Do About It?, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com
/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-greenhouse-driverless-job-loss-20160922-snap-story.html [https://
perma.cc/N49P-3ZE8]; Casey Newton, Uber Will Eventually Replace All Its Drivers with Self-
Driving Cars, VERGE (May 28, 2014, 3:52 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2014/5/28/5758734
/uber-will-eventually-replace-all-its-drivers-with-self-driving-cars [https://perma.cc
/QN7W-CBP9]. 
2. Jane Wakeﬁeld, Foxconn Replaces ‘60,000 Factory Workers with Robots,’ BBC NEWS (May 25, 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36376966 [https://perma.cc/XQ3A-6DSG]. 
3. See ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: HOW THE DIGITAL 
REVOLUTION IS ACCELERATING INNOVATION, DRIVING PRODUCTIVITY, AND IRREVERSIBLY 
TRANSFORMING EMPLOYMENT AND THE ECONOMY (2012) [hereinafter BRYNJOLFSSON & 
MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE]; ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SEC-
OND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLO-
GIES (2014); MARTIN FORD, RISE OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A JOBLESS 
FUTURE (2015); JERRY KAPLAN, HUMANS NEED NOT APPLY: A GUIDE TO WEALTH AND WORK 
IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2015); ANDREW STERN & LEE KRAVITZ, RAISING THE 
FLOOR: HOW A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME CAN RENEW OUR ECONOMY AND REBUILD THE 
AMERICAN DREAM (2016). 
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ever-wider range of tasks.
4
 Putting aside the more fantastical predictions about 
artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) dominating or even devouring its human creators,
5
 the 
prospects for job destruction are eye-opening. Robotic and digital production of 
goods and services, coupled with advances in AI and machine learning, is poised 
to take over both routine or repetitive tasks and some more advanced tasks. In 
one much-cited reckoning, nearly half of the jobs in the current economy are at 
risk.
6
 Although some new jobs are readily foreseeable—especially skilled jobs 
working with technology—no large new sectors or industries yet visible on the 
horizon appear likely to absorb the multitudes of human workers who might be 
displaced. Within this camp, predictions range from a tsunami of job losses to a 
more manageable rising tide.  
For other observers, the real threat from automation is not a net loss of jobs 
but growing polarization of the labor market.
7
 These observers note that auto-
mation generates large productivity gains and proﬁts for some, while destroying 
many decent midlevel jobs. They predict a growing economic chasm between 
those who create or own the new technology, or whose high-end skills are com-
plemented by that technology, and most workers who are stuck competing for 
the less-skilled but still human jobs that remain. In this scenario, labor shortages 
in some skilled-job categories will coexist with labor surpluses and downward 
wage pressure outside those categories. 
The prospect of large net job losses and sharper income polarization has gen-




4. See, e.g., BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 3; FORD, supra 
note 3; STERN & KRAVITZ, supra note 3. 
5. One such example is the “grey goo” scenario, in which self-replicating nanorobots rapidly 
consume all organic matter on Earth. See K. ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION 172-73 
(1986).
 
6. Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs 
to Computerisation? 44 (Oxford Martin Sch., Working Paper, 2013), https://www 
.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S6F6-ZSMP]. On competing estimates of automatability, see infra Section I.B. 
7. See Laura Tyson & Michael Spence, Exploring the Effects of Technology on Income and Wealth 
Inequality, in AFTER PIKETTY: THE AGENDA FOR ECONOMICS AND INEQUALITY 170, 172-73 
(Heather Boushey, J. Bradford DeLong & Marshall Steinbaum eds., 2017); Richard B. Free-
man, Who Owns the Robots Rules the World, IZA WORLD LAB. 1, 9 (2015), https://wol.iza.org
/uploads/articles/5/pdfs/who-owns-the-robots-rules-the-world.pdf [https://perma.cc
/V8R9-7PRX]; see also TYLER COWEN, AVERAGE IS OVER: POWERING AMERICA BEYOND THE 
AGE OF THE GREAT STAGNATION 37-38 (2013). Economists who do see a new threat from au-
tomation tend to predict a greater impact on wages than on employment. See Freeman, supra, 
at 4. 
8. Among proponents, see GUY STANDING, BASIC INCOME: A GUIDE FOR THE OPEN-MINDED 
(2017); STERN & KRAVITZ, supra note 3; PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS & YANNICK VANDERBORGHT, 
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reduction of maximum working hours,
9
 and public investments in job crea-
tion.
10
 Before taking up responses to feared job losses, however, we must turn to 
the other side in the debate over the impact of automation on jobs—that is, those 
who discount the claim that “this time is different,” and would predict the future 
of automation from its past. 
For many economists, the current wave of automation anxiety amounts to 
misguided scaremongering by modern-day Luddites.
11
 After all, they point out, 
the prediction that automation will supplant human labor on a massive scale has 
recurred in both utopian and dystopian ﬂavors throughout the history of indus-
 
BASIC INCOME: A RADICAL PROPOSAL FOR A FREE SOCIETY AND A SANE ECONOMY (2017); and 
Erik Olin Wright, Basic Income, Stakeholder Grants, and Class Analysis, 32 POL. & SOC’Y 79 
(2004). The idea has found support on the right as well as the left. See, e.g., MILTON FRIED-
MAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191-95 (1962) (proposing a universal minimum income in 
the form of a negative income tax). Indeed, the idea can be traced back to the sixteenth century 
and Thomas More’s Utopia. See History of Basic Income, BASIC INCOME EARTH NETWORK, 
http://basicincome.org/basic-income/history [https://perma.cc/B4TK-CHQK]. For critics 
of the UBI, see, for example, Daniel Sage & Patrick Diamond, Europe’s New Social Reality: The 
Case Against Universal Basic Income, POL’Y NETWORK (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.policy 
-network.net/publications/6190/Europes-New-Social-Reality-the-Case-Against-Universal 
-Basic-Income [https://perma.cc/PKB9-JCRR]. For a recent compilation of views, pro and 
con, see PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, BASIC INCOME AND THE LEFT: A EUROPEAN DEBATE (2018). 
9. See BENJAMIN HUNNICUTT, FREE TIME: THE FORGOTTEN AMERICAN DREAM (2013); Matthew 
Dimick, Better Than Basic Income? Liberty, Equality, and the Regulation of Working Time, 50 IND. 
L. REV. 473 (2017). I address proposals to reduce working hours brieﬂy below, see infra Section 
I.D, and plan to return to the topic in future work. 
10. See THE JOB GUARANTEE: TOWARD TRUE FULL EMPLOYMENT (Michael J. Murray & Mathew 
Forstater eds., 2013). For recent calls among American left-liberals for a government-backed 
jobs guarantee, see, for example, Sean McElwee, Colin McAuliffe & Jon Green, Why Democrats 
Should Embrace a Federal Jobs Guarantee, NATION (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www 
.thenation.com/article/why-democrats-should-embrace-a-federal-jobs-guarantee [https://
perma.cc/PM9D-FWS3]; Robert E. Rubin, Opinion, Why the U.S. Needs a Federal Jobs Pro-
gram, Not Payouts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/opinion
/federal-jobs-program-payouts.html [https://perma.cc/VKF8-XTXK]; Mark Paul et al., The 
Federal Job Guarantee—A Policy to Achieve Permanent Full Employment, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/full-employment/the 
-federal-job-guarantee-a-policy-to-achieve-permanent-full-employment [https://perma
.cc/TJN9-QJJF]; and Neera Tanden et al., Toward a Marshall Plan for America: Rebuilding Our 
Towns, Cities, and the Middle Class, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 16, 2017), https://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/05/16/432499/toward-marshall-plan 
-america [https://perma.cc/J8CS-Q4HM]. 
11. See, e.g., Ben Miller & Robert D. Atkinson, Are Robots Taking Our Jobs, or Making Them?, INFO. 
TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 1 (Sept. 2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-are-robots-taking 
-jobs.pdf [https://perma.cc/XP76-QWXF]. 




 Futurists of the past have predicted that mass automation will 
usher in an era of human liberation from toil, or that it will immiserate all but 
the fortunate few who own or create the machines.
13
 Time and again, however, 
the economy has deﬁed such predictions. For centuries, automation has been 
destroying some jobs while creating other jobs—usually better paid and less gru-
eling—and driving economic growth and prosperity. In short, the history of au-
tomation’s impact on the labor market has been one of “creative destruction,” a 
mantra to which many economists adhere today.
14
 
The debate over automation and jobs rages within and between the ﬁelds of 
economics and information technology.
15
 Among technology experts canvassed 
in 2014, nearly half said they believed that “networked, automated, [AI] appli-
cations and robotic devices [will] have displaced more jobs than they have cre-
ated by 2025.”
16
 By contrast, a 2014 survey of academic economists found wide 
agreement that “[a]dvancing automation has not historically reduced employ-
 
12. For two famous examples, see KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ben 
Fowkes trans., Penguin Books 1976) (1867), which argued that automation yielded both al-
ienation and immiseration on the one hand and the potential for human liberation on the 
other; and John Maynard Keynes, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, in ESSAYS IN 
PERSUASION (1931), which predicted that productivity in the United States and Europe would 
improve so dramatically in one hundred years that people would work only three hours per 
day. 
13. See Ryan Avent, Opinion, A World Without Work Is Coming—It Could Be Utopia or It Could Be 
Hell, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree
/2016/sep/19/world-without-work-utopia-hell-human-labour-obsolete [https://perma.cc
/4XTP-XM4Y]; Ross Douthat, Opinion, A World Without Work, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/opinion/sunday/douthat-a-world-without-work
.html [https://perma.cc/8ZPA-CXSQ]; Bernard Marr, The 4th Industrial Revolution and a Job-
less Future—A Good Thing?, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2017, 2:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/bernardmarr/2017/03/03/the-4th-industrial-revolution-and-a-jobless-future-a-good-thing 
[https://perma.cc/UT6T-36LV]; Derek Thompson, A World Without Work, ATLANTIC 
(July/Aug. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/07/world-without 
-work/395294 [https://perma.cc/M75C-H7U2]. 
14. See David H. Autor, Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace 
Automation, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 9-10 (2015). The concept of “creative destruction” within 
capitalism was named and elucidated by Joseph Schumpeter. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (3d ed. 1975). 
15. For a review of recent economic scholarship on automation, see infra notes 44-59. 
16. Aaron Smith & Janna Anderson, AI, Robotics, and the Future of Jobs, PEW RES. CTR. 5 (Aug. 6, 
2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/08/06/future-of-jobs [https://perma.cc/PG4R 
-LHYK]. 
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ment in the United States”
17
 (which sidesteps the claim that “this time is differ-
ent”). Yet one-third of them agreed that automation was “a central reason why 




The debate over the impact of automation also divides economists on the left 
who are chieﬂy concerned with the well-being of ordinary workers. For example, 
economists at the left-leaning Economic Policy Institute
19
 reject both the job-
killing story and the income-polarization story about automation.
20
 For them, 
the very real problem of wage stagnation stems not from technology but from 
globalization of trade and ﬁnance, declining union strength, and lagging en-
forcement of labor standards. By contrast, labor-friendly Harvard economist 
Richard Freeman believes that this time really is different, and that technology 
has already contributed to a historic shift in the distribution of income over the 
past two decades “toward robots/capital and against labor.”
21
 Freeman expects 
technology to affect wages more than employment: “The ‘iron law’ of the effect 
of robots on pay is that increased substitutability with human skills puts down-
ward pressure on the wages of persons doing competing tasks—a pressure likely 




This vigorous debate is not likely to be resolved within the legal academy; 
yet legal scholars, and especially scholars of labor and employment law, cannot 
afford to ignore it. In the United States, as in many developed countries, the 
employment relationship has long served as the platform for delivering a pleth-
ora of rights, protections, and beneﬁts that enable people to live a decent life. 
 
17. Robots, CHI. BOOTH: IGM F. (Feb. 25, 2014, 1:55 PM), http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys
/robots [https://perma.cc/QY4Y-MPUY]. 
18. Id. 
19. The Economic Policy Institute is a “nonproﬁt, nonpartisan think tank created in 1986 to in-
clude the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions.” About, 
ECON. POL’Y INST., https://www.epi.org/about [https://perma.cc/84XY-D5JS]. 
20. See Lawrence Mishel & Josh Bivens, The Zombie Robot Argument Lurches On: There Is No Evi-
dence that Automation Leads to Joblessness or Inequality, ECON. POL’Y INST. (May 24, 2017), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/the-zombie-robot-argument-lurches-on-there-is-no 
-evidence-that-automation-leads-to-joblessness-or-inequality [https://perma.cc/MP8X 
-TMBQ]; see also John Schmitt et al., Don’t Blame the Robots: Assessing the Job Polarization Ex-
planation of Growing Wage Inequality, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.epi.org
/publication/technology-inequality-dont-blame-the-robots [https://perma.cc/ZUG9 
-7UWB]. 
21. Freeman, supra note 7, at 4. 
22. Id. 
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Automation-related job losses threaten to further destabilize that already-precar-
ious platform. It is thus imperative that we try to understand how automation 
will affect the law of work—and how the law of work will affect the future tra-
jectory of automation. This Article aims to advance that understanding and to 
propose an optimal strategy for the law of work in the face of uncertainty about 
automation’s impact on the labor market. 
An optimal response to automation must take into account three other labor-
market problems that are far less controversial among those who focus on work-
ers’ well-being: rising income inequality, the erosion of labor standards for low-
wage workers, and the role of “ﬁssuring”—the substitution of outside contrac-
tors for employees—in both trends.
23
 If we can ﬁnd ways to meet the still-con-
tested challenge of automation that will also address—or at least not exacer-
bate—the more certain challenges of ﬁssuring, inequality, and deteriorating 
labor standards, then we will be on solid ground. 
It is crucial to recognize at the outset that the existing law of work adds to 
the costs of employing human labor, and that new and improved worker beneﬁts 
and higher labor standards would further increase those costs. As such, the law 
of work contributes both to ﬁrms’ ﬂight from direct employment through ﬁs-
suring and to their substitution of machines for human workers. In response to 
ﬁssuring, many scholars and advocates seek to shore up what I call the “fortress 
of employment” by extending ﬁrms’ legal responsibility for workers in their sup-
ply chain, in most cases by expanding the deﬁnitions of “employee” and “em-
ployer.”
24
 But automation confounds that strategy by offering ﬁrms a more com-
plete exit from the costs, risks, and hassles associated with human labor. 
Extending ﬁrms’ responsibility for workers in their supply chain not only fails 
to meet the challenge of automation; it also modestly exacerbates that challenge 
by raising the cost of human labor versus machines. As technology becomes an 
increasingly capable and cost-effective competitor to human workers, it may 
doom the prevailing strategy of shoring up the fortress of employment. 
In response to these concerns, this Article explores ways to reduce the legal 
tax on employment while protecting the essential rights and entitlements of 
those who work for a living. The initial move is to separate the question of what 
workers’ entitlements should be from the question of where their economic bur-
dens should fall. Some worker entitlements (a term I use to include rights, pro-
tections, and beneﬁts of various kinds) are inextricable from employer duties; 
 
23. “Fissuring” is the term David Weil deployed to capture the strong trend of ﬁrms outsourcing 
labor needs to outside contractors. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK 
BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 7-27 (2017). The trend 
is described below, infra Section II.A. 
24. See infra text accompanying notes 176-178. 
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their cost must as a practical matter, or should as a deterrence matter, be borne 
by employers. But entitlements that are not productively linked to employment 
in these ways tend to create counterproductive incentives to offload workers. We 
should aim to shift the burdens associated with the latter set of entitlements 
away from employment and off of employers’ balance sheets.
25
  That would 
modestly reduce ﬁrms’ incentive to replace employees with contractors and hu-
man workers with machines. It would also extend some essential entitlements 
to those left outside the fortress of employment and allow for the pursuit of re-
distribution through alternative funding mechanisms—a more-than-incidental 
virtue in our increasingly unequal economy. 
I begin in Part I with a closer look at job destruction and job creation through 
automation, and at the equally contested question of whether we should wel-
come or worry about the prospect of net job losses. In Part II, I delve into ﬁrms’ 
decisions regarding both automation and ﬁssuring, and discuss why the chal-
lenge of automation confounds prevailing legal and policy responses to the chal-
lenges of ﬁssuring, declining labor standards, and inequality. Finally, Part III 
charts a path forward in the face of factual uncertainty and multiple objectives, 
and it considers critiques of, and alternatives to, that proposed path. 
i .  “this time is  different”:  the next wave of automation 
and why we should worry  
The history of automation is the history of economic development. At least 
since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, machines have been replacing hu-
man labor, beginning with the production of food, textiles, and clothing—tasks 
which had occupied the bulk of humanity for millennia.
26
 Machines and the 
newly collectivized modes of production they enabled supplanted most artisanal 
production while vastly increasing efficiency, driving down the cost of basic con-
sumer goods and freeing up human labor for new industries that catered to the 
evolving appetites of a more prosperous population.
27
 In particular, major tech-
 
25. A kindred strategy is sketched near the end of Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Plat-
form Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 517-18 (2016), as an alter-
native to privatization of worker beneﬁts. Rogers touts some of the same virtues of socializing 
employment-based beneﬁts: promoting economic equality, reducing employer domination, 
and expanding access to beneﬁts. See id. 
26. See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF 
LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 595 (2016). 
27. See id. at 62-93. 
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nological innovations from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s brought vast im-
provements in most people’s lives and standards of living.
28
 Since the mid-twen-
tieth century, technology has continued to destroy some jobs, to create others, to 




So what’s not to like about automation going forward? The answer, fore-
shadowed above, lies in the prospect of growing inequality and net job losses. 
First, the economic gains that labor-replacing technology has helped to generate, 
though widely shared during the middle of the twentieth century, have been 
sharply skewed toward the top of the income scale since the 1970s.
30
 Automation 
has likely contributed to that skewed income distribution and will likely exacer-
bate it in the future.
31
 Second, because emerging technologies are able to repli-
cate or surpass a wider swath of human capabilities, there is more reason this 
time around to expect job destruction to outpace job creation. But debate persists 
over both whether net job destruction is likely and whether that would be good 
or bad. After all, less work might sound more like a blessing than a curse to many 
hard-working people, now and throughout history. This Part will address both 
debates, not with an eye to settling them but in order to frame the analysis that 
follows. 
A. What Is New About the New Wave of Automating Technologies? 
Those who predict that the coming wave of automation will defy historical 
patterns in its impact on jobs point to the distinctive nature of the emerging 
technology. Advances in both hard and soft forms of technology—robots and 
algorithms, for example—are replicating a wider range of human capabilities 
and weaving together those distinct capabilities more seamlessly than ever be-
fore. The very terms “artiﬁcial intelligence” and “machine learning” hint at what 
is new: technology is acquiring and reﬁning cognitive and sensory capabilities 
 
28. See id. at 94-95. 
29. See id. at 566-604. 
30. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Gold-
hammer trans., 2014) (chronicling increasing levels of economic inequality in countries such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom). 
31. See Freeman, supra note 7, at 4-5; McKinsey Glob. Inst., A Future that Works: Automation, Em-
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that had long been thought to be uniquely human, and is outpacing humans at 
increasingly complex tasks. 
A few arresting examples underscore the point. Consider the lip-reading 
prowess of a program developed by Google and Oxford University using “deep 
learning” technology. In 2016, the program far outperformed an expert human 
lip reader, reading four times as many clips without error.
32
 More familiar is the 
victory of computers over human champions at the game of Jeopardy!,
33
 as well 
as two notoriously complex board games: chess (in 1996)
34
 and the more intri-
cate Go (in 2016).
35
 The Go saga suggests what is revolutionary about AI and 
machine learning: Google’s AlphaGo program, which beat the reigning human 
champion in 2016, worked by analyzing a vast database of actual human games 
of Go. Its successor, AlphaGo Zero, learned the game and chose its moves based 
solely on the rules and logic of the game itself. Just one year after AlphaGo’s 
triumph, “AlphaGo Zero . . . trounced the older program 100 games to zero, 
[while running] on just four processors, compared with the older AI’s 48.”
36
 
Another example can be found in the ﬁeld of natural-language translation. 
In July 2016, Jason Furman, then Chairman of the White House Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors, used translation as a prime example of humans’ enduring ad-
vantages over computers: “AI today can do decent translations but cannot come 
close to what a human can do with his or her knowledge of both languages, social 
and cultural context, and sense of the author’s argument, emotional states, and 
intentions.”
37
 Just four months later, Google launched a new version of Google 
 
32. MGI, A Future that Works, supra note 31, at 26. 
33. See John Markoff, Computer Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: Trivial, It’s Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/science/17jeopardy-watson.html [https://perma.cc
/AB53-DV7V]. 
34. See Bruce Weber, In Upset, Computer Beats Chess Champion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 1996), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/11/us/in-upset-computer-beats-chess-champion.html 
[https://perma.cc/28SW-XY72]. 
35. See Choe Sang-Hun, Google’s Computer Program Beats Lee Se-dol in Go Tournament, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/world/asia/korea-alphago-vs-lee 
-sedol-go.html [https://perma.cc/FMV5-USXK]. 
36. See Matthew Hutson, This Computer Program Can Beat Humans at Go—With No Human In-
struction, SCIENCE (Oct. 18, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/10
/computer-program-can-beat-humans-go-no-human-instruction [https://perma.cc/LCA9 
-M36M]. 
37. Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisors, Address at New York University: Is This 
Time Different? The Opportunities and Challenges of Artiﬁcial Intelligence 4 (July 7, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/page/ﬁles/20160707_cea_ai 
_furman.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT7V-WQ8X]. 
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Translate that exploited recent advances in machine learning to dramatically im-
prove results.
38
 Google Translate suddenly became a much closer rival to human 
translators—except that the former is free and instantaneous. 
Of course, not many jobs require lip reading, strategic gaming, or natural-
language translation. But given the complex nature of these human skills, the 
examples illustrate how far technology has come in recent years and how fast it 
is advancing. The examples also suggest the potential for replacing human labor. 
Once these systems are developed, they can be replicated and deployed innumer-
able times at little or no marginal cost. 
Then there are the robots, which are making big inroads in manufacturing 
and logistics. Just around the corner are so-called dark factories with so few hu-
man workers that “you could switch the lights off and leave the place to the ma-
chines.”
39
 The Kiva robots that help to automate the “picking and packing” pro-
cess at some large Amazon warehouses have sped up operations while cutting 
costs by about 20%.
40
 Their human coworkers are ambivalent. “While walking 
the aisles was ‘good cardio,’” reported one Amazon employee, “the new system 
lets him get through more orders.”
41




Aside from the distressing sacriﬁce of sociability, the point about efficiency 
can be generalized. Like the Kiva robots, technology both replaces human labor 
 
38. See Sage Lazzaro, Google Is Using Artiﬁcial Intelligence to Make a Huge Change to Its Translate 
Tool, N.Y. OBSERVER (Mar. 6, 2017, 3:04 PM), https://observer.com/2017/03/google-translate
-neural-update [https://perma.cc/944Z-QF6U]; Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awak-
ening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14
/magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html [https://perma.cc/4KR5-6EZQ]. 
39. Will Knight, China Is Building a Robot Army of Model Workers, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 26, 
2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601215/china-is-building-a-robot-army-of 
-model-workers [https://perma.cc/8EQV-LNN7]. 
40. Eugene Kim, Amazon’s $775 Million Deal for Robotics Company Kiva Is Starting to Look Really 
Smart, BUS. INSIDER (June 15, 2016, 4:02 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/kiva-robots 
-save-money-for-amazon-2016-6 [https://perma.cc/S2NY-7VS5]; see also 10 Most Amazing 
Robots in the World, VENTUREPACT (Nov. 11, 2016), http://blog.venturepact.com/10-most 
-amazing-robots-in-the-world [https://perma.cc/AYZ6-YKDG] (“The Kiva robot is about 
16 inches tall, weighing around 320 pounds, square-shaped, yellow machine that runs on 
wheels. They can run at a steady 5 mph and haul packages weighing up to 700 pounds. Kiva 
robots pick up shelves of products from the warehouse ﬂoor and bring them to a human em-
ployee who picks items and then packs them for shipping. While navigating, they avoid run-
ning into each other by using sensors that talk to one another.”). 
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and complements human labor, or makes it more productive.
43
 The latter func-
tion is part of how automation can create jobs. Both sides of the equation have 
drawn empirical scrutiny and generated debate, as discussed in the next two Sec-
tions. 
B. Estimating Automatability and the Pace of Job Destruction 
A recent spate of studies seeks to measure the extent of “automatability” of 
existing jobs.
44
 Estimates vary from less than 10% to nearly half of jobs in the 
United States.
45
 Here, I rely chieﬂy on a 2017 report by a team of researchers at 
the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), which analyzed what current technology 
can do and what humans are currently paid to do, both at a fairly granular level, 
in order to determine how much human work in today’s economy can be auto-
mated.
46
 The team looked at several major economies, but my focus here is on 
the U.S. results. The MGI study captures both the dramatic potential for job loss 
and the uncertainty of its time frame and extent.
47
 
On the capabilities of current technology, the MGI researchers identiﬁed 
eighteen distinct human capabilities in ﬁve broad categories—sensory percep-
tion, cognitive skills, natural-language processing, social and emotional skills, 
 
43. For an attempt to model both dimensions of automation, see Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Re-
strepo, Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Automation and Work (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 24196, 2018), which discusses how automation creates both a “displacement effect” 
and a “productivity effect.” 
44. Compare, e.g., Frey & Osborne, supra note 6, at 44 (estimating that nearly half of all jobs are 
at “high risk” of automation), with Melanie Arntz et al., The Risk of Automation for Jobs in 
OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis 4 (OECD Soc., Emp. & Migration, Working Paper 
No. 189, 2016), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/the-risk-of 
-automation-for-jobs-in-oecd-countries_5jlz9h56dvq7-en [https://perma.cc/ZJU7-UGUD] 
(estimating that, on average, 9% of jobs in Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) countries are at risk). 
45. See supra note 44. The OECD study above criticizes Frey & Osborne, supra note 6, for overes-
timating automatability by failing to disaggregate occupations. However, the OECD study in 
turn appears to underestimate automatability by focusing on fully automatable jobs, and by 
discounting ﬁrms’ ability (over time) to consolidate nonautomatable tasks into a smaller 
number of human jobs. 
46. For those who might be suspicious of a study conducted by the research arm of a major busi-
ness-consulting ﬁrm, it is worth noting that its headline estimate of automatability is virtually 
identical to the oft-cited Frey & Osborne study, supra note 6. I use the MGI study here because 
it breaks down the data and analyzes automation decisions in especially useful ways, and be-
cause MGI followed up that study with a similarly useful companion study of potential job 
creation, see infra Section I.C. 
47. See MGI, A Future that Works, supra note 31, at 1-3. 
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and physical skills—and assessed how current technology stacks up against hu-
man performance on these dimensions.
48
 Not surprisingly, humans still outper-
form technology at sensing others’ emotional state and responding in emotion-
ally appropriate ways (although technology is making headway).
49
 On the other 
hand, technology already outperforms most humans in many physical and cog-
nitive skills.
50
 On some tasks like data processing, computers obviously leave 
even the most skilled human being in the dust on both speed and accuracy.
51
 
While it is clear that machines have gained ground on humans across a wide 
range of skills and capabilities, how much actual human work can be automated? 
The MGI researchers broke down human work activities into seven large cate-
gories and analyzed what percentage of the time humans spend on each of those 
activities is capable of being automated “by adapting currently demonstrated 
technology.”
52
 Least automatable are management and development of people 
(9%); application of expertise to decision making, planning, and creative tasks 
(18%); interacting with stakeholders like customers, suppliers, or the public 
(20%); and unpredictable physical activities (26%). Much more automatable are 




Because the mix of workers’ activities varies widely by sector and by occupa-
tion, so does automatability. The MGI researchers estimate that, at one end of 
the spectrum, work in the accommodation and food services sector is 73% au-
tomatable; that is, 73% of the time for which humans are now paid in that sector 
is spent in activities that could be automated with existing technology.
54
 By com-
parison, work in the health care and social assistance sector is just 36% automat-
able.
55
 (Readers employed in “educational services” will be happy to learn that 
it is the least automatable large sector at 27%.
56
) At the ﬁner level of occupations, 
 
48. See id. at 35 exhibit 3. 
49. See id. at 29, 35 exhibit 3, 72. 
50. See id. at 1, 3, 10, 24 exhibit 1, 26, 35 exhibit 3. The researchers conclude that machines can 
match or surpass several human capabilities, including “information retrieval, gross motor 
skills, and optimization and planning.” Id. at 10. 
51. Id. at 6 exhibit E3, 7 exhibit E4. 
52. Id. at 42 exhibit 8. 
53. Id. Not all activities within a category are equally automatable. For example, the predictable 
physical activities involved in “accommodation and food services” are over 90% automatable, 
while those involved in “health care and social assistance” are only 50 to 60% automatable. Id. 
at 44 exhibit 9. 
54. Id. at 44 exhibit 9. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
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the work of both sewing machine operators and graders of agricultural products 
is nearly 100% automatable, while that of psychiatrists is between 0 and 10% 
automatable.
57
 It is not just professional jobs that are relatively insulated from 
automation. Some low-wage jobs are hard to automate because they involve un-
predictable physical tasks (janitors, landscape workers, and domestic workers, 
for example) or social and emotional skills (childcare or eldercare workers, for 
example),
58
 but pay remains low, primarily because those basic skills are far from 
scarce in the labor force. 
Putting these data sets together, the MGI researchers estimate that 46% of all 
of the time for which people are now paid in the U.S. economy is spent in activities that 
could be automated based on “currently demonstrated technology.”
59
 That estimate is 
especially eye-opening because it does not take into account the impact of future 
innovations, including technology that exists today but has not yet been adapted 
to perform work in today’s economy. 
A focus on the technology itself, however, might lead one to overestimate the 
speed or extent of job destruction. Technical automatability is only the threshold 
factor in ﬁrms’ business decisions about automation. For one thing, it is no easy 
matter to disaggregate automatable tasks from those that humans still do better. 
As David Autor writes, “many of the tasks currently bundled into . . . jobs cannot 
readily be unbundled . . . without a substantial drop in quality.”
60 
Consider, for 
example, the automation of customer service, which reduces costs but may an-
noy and alienate customers.
61 
It will take time and managerial skill to reconﬁgure 
jobs and organizations. It will also require some highly skilled workers to imple-




In view of these challenges and uncertainties, the MGI study is circumspect 
about how long it is likely to take to move from technical automatability to large-
scale automation, with estimates ranging from two to six decades. The process 
is likely to be faster for software innovations (which are easier and cheaper to 
 
57. Id. at 5 exhibit E2. 
58. Id. at 35, 45, 81 exhibit 20. 
59. Id. at 32 (emphasis added). This estimate is nearly identical to that of the widely cited Oxford 
study. See Frey & Osborne, supra note 6, at 38 (estimating 47% automatability). 
60. Autor, supra note 14, at 27. 
61. See Callan Wienburg, How to Stop Customer Service Automation from Annoying Your Customers, 
SOLIDITECH (May 13, 2016), http://blog.soliditech.com/blog/how-to-stop-customer-service
-automation-from-annoying-your-customers [https://perma.cc/P2TL-HRRV]. 
62. MGI, A Future that Works, supra note 31, at 114-15. 
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implement) than for robots, faster for higher-wage but automatable jobs, and 
faster in higher-wage countries like the United States.
63
 
The MGI study identiﬁes one large and pervasive factor in managers’ deci-
sions about automation: labor costs. If an existing technology—a robot or a soft-
ware solution—is capable of performing certain tasks for which a ﬁrm currently 
employs humans, then the ﬁrm must weigh the costs of acquiring, operating, 
and maintaining the technology, and of reorganizing operations accordingly, 
against the potential gains.
64
 Chief among those gains is labor cost savings: how 
many hours of human labor could be saved, and what are the direct and indirect 
costs associated with that labor? Other less-quantiﬁable gains in safety, reliabil-
ity, and quality, for example, may be even greater in some cases. But labor costs 
are obviously crucial, and will inevitably affect the pace of automation. As a re-
sult, the most automatable jobs may not be the ﬁrst to disappear. While jobs in 
“accommodations and food services” are among the most automatable in the 
U.S. economy (73%), low wages in that sector tend to slow the process of auto-
mation.
65
 I will return below to the link between labor costs and automation de-
cisions. 
Strikingly, the MGI report concludes that automation is currently proceed-
ing too slowly to garner all of the gains that it could generate.
66
 Firms are failing 
to capture the efficiency and productivity gains that are already possible with 
existing technology.
67
 And societies are missing out on the gains that are neces-
sary, especially in aging societies, to drive economic growth.
68
 But even if faster 
automation can generate greater gains, it might also generate greater losses in 
the form of displaced workers. That depends on the other side of the equation—
new job creation—where the debate about automation and jobs is least empiri-
cally grounded. 
 
63. Id. at 10, 12, 40, 31, 53, 76-77, 80, 83, 95-96. 
64. Id. at 67-70. 
65. Id. at 7 exhibit E4, 68. 
66. Id. at 109-16; see also Furman, supra note 37, at 4 (“We have had substantial innovation in 
robotics, AI, and other areas in the last decade. But we will need a much faster pace of inno-
vation in these areas to really move the dial on productivity growth going forward.”); Mat-
thew Yglesias, The Automation Myth, VOX (July 27, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.vox.com
/2015/7/27/9038829/automation-myth [https://perma.cc/Y7R6-BWTR] (arguing that the 
pace of automation must accelerate to meet society’s basic needs). 
67. And the MGI researchers’ counterparts on the consulting side of McKinsey are urging ﬁrms 
to better “capture the opportunity from automation” with their help. See Robotics & Automation, 
MCKINSEY & COMPANY, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/how 
-we-help-clients/robotics-and-automation [https://perma.cc/VW3V-PTLJ]. 
68. See MGI, A Future that Works, supra note 31, at 112-13. 
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C. Estimating New Job Creation Through Labor Complementarity, Consumer 
Surplus, and New Products and Services 
Like many economists, the MGI researchers tend toward optimism about the 
economic impact of technology, and toward a belief that historical patterns of 
creative destruction through innovation will continue. As of early 2017, their pre-
diction that automation would spur economic growth in the United States and 
across the globe was based on an explicit assumption that “human labor dis-
placed by automation would rejoin the workforce and be as productive as it was 
in 2014, that is, new demand for labor will be created.”
69
 That looks like a colos-
sal leap of faith when compared with the meticulous and sophisticated analysis 
behind the estimates of likely job losses. But a more recent MGI report seeks to 
identify sources of new or increased demand for labor that might absorb workers 
displaced by automation, and to quantify new job creation.
70
 
The new MGI study parallels recent efforts by leading economists to model 
the impact of automation on both job destruction and job creation and to come 
to grips analytically and empirically with the contingencies affecting the econ-
omy’s absorption of displaced workers into new jobs.
71
 Daron Acemoglu and 
Pascual Restrepo conclude in a recent paper that, contrary to “accounts empha-
sizing that technology always increases the demand for labor and beneﬁts work-
ers,” some technological innovations might “simultaneously reduce wages and 
employment.”
72
 Examining empirical trends, David Autor and Anna Salomons 
 
69. Id. at 90. Indeed, it is “vital that there be new demand for labor displaced by automation.” Id. 
On automation’s expected contribution to growth, see id. at 87-101. 
70. McKinsey Glob. Inst., Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained: Workforce Transitions in a Time of Automation, 





71. See Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 43. 
72. Id. at 6, 11. Another recent study by Acemoglu and Restrepo found that investments in robots 
are associated with localized net job losses. Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Robots and 
Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
23285, Mar. 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23285.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX5E 
-ZK5A]. For an early reaction, see Thomas Claburn, Robots Are Killing Jobs After All, Appar-
ently: One Droid Equals 5.6 Workers, REGISTER (Mar. 28, 2017, 10:22 PM), https://www
.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/28/robots_are_killing_jobs_after_all [https://perma.cc/UNY3 
-SR9N]. 
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ﬁnd that “automation has become increasingly labor-displacing in recent dec-
ades, both at the industry level and in aggregate.”
73
 Economists—both modelers 
and measurers—are thus questioning and testing the historically grounded con-
ventional wisdom on creative destruction. 
Automation can create new jobs in several different ways. First and most ob-
viously, there will be new jobs for those who create, implement, maintain, and 
work with the new technology itself.
74
 Second, the productivity gains and cost 
savings stemming from automation can increase consumer surplus, which in 
turn can generate new demand for human labor both in existing job categories 
and in new types of jobs that produce goods and services that do not exist in the 
current economy.
75
 The crucial—and exceptionally difficult—question is how 
many new jobs we are likely to see from all these sources. Not surprisingly, pre-
dictions about job creation are much hazier and harder to quantify than predic-
tions of job losses, which turn on observable features of existing jobs and exist-
ing technology. 
The MGI researchers’ bottom-line prediction for the United States is that job 
creation could just about keep pace with job destruction in the coming decades.
76
 
Yet they hedge this prediction with some qualiﬁcations and contingencies that 
should unsettle any complacency about “creative destruction.” First, they explic-
itly base their break-even prediction on what they call the “step-up scenario,” 
which requires major new public and private investments in training and educa-
tion, human services, infrastructure, and income support.
77
 Second, their pre-
diction assumes that the pace of job destruction through automation is at the 
mean point of the MGI’s large estimated ranges.
78
 If the pace of job destruction 
 
73. David Autor & Anna Salomons, Is Automation Labor-Displacing? Productivity Growth, Employ-
ment, and the Labor Share, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 8 (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/1_autorsalomons.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4XQ4-5NVA]. 
74. Cf. Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 43, at 10 (describing new jobs that could be created to 
maintain and deploy new AI technologies in health care, design, and education); MGI, Jobs 
Lost, Jobs Gained, supra note 70, at 7 (estimating that twenty to ﬁfty million jobs related to 
developing and deploying new technology could be created by 2030). 
75. Regarding other possible sources of new jobs, see Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 43, at 10, 
which discusses the possibility that “rapid automation may endogenously generate incentives 
for ﬁrms to introduce new labor-intensive tasks.” The MGI economists suggest that by 2030, 
“9 percent of the US labor force could be employed in occupations that do not exist today.” 
MGI, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained, supra note 70, at 70. 
76. See MGI, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained, supra note 70, at 14 (ﬁnding that “[e]nough jobs are created 
in the step-up scenario . . . to offset both automation and the growth in labor force”). 
77. Id. at 6-8. 
78. Id. at 6-8, 11. 
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is faster, then job creation will not keep pace even under the step-up scenario, 
with its various stimulating and mitigating measures. 
Even apart from those two big explicit “ifs,” the MGI estimates seem to de-
pend on some worrisome circularities. The lion’s share of new jobs is supposed 
to stem from higher consumer incomes and the resulting increase in demand for 
goods and services that more productive machines will help to generate.
79
 But 
what if income growth is sharply skewed toward the rich, and especially toward 
owners of capital, rather than being widely distributed through new, decently 
paid jobs?
80
 (That would affect job growth because richer people spend propor-
tionally less of their income on goods and services.
81
) And what if consumer ap-
petites are not inexhaustible but increasingly sated? (The so-called “full closet 
effect” has the potential to dampen new consumer demand for goods—if not for 
services and “experiences.”
82
) Finally, what if the new goods and services that 
people want can themselves be produced largely by robots or algorithms instead 
of by humans? There are, in short, reasons to doubt that increased consumer 
income will be the engine of job creation that it has been in the past.
83
 
If predictions of new job creation prove too optimistic for any of the reasons 
suggested above, or if job destruction outpaces current estimates, then many 
workers displaced from midlevel jobs over the next few decades may ﬁnd them-
selves competing for jobs that are hard to automate but require no special human 
skills or that are not worth automating because wages are so low. 
All sides in the debate over automation’s impact on jobs are on the lookout 
for evidence of that impact on today’s economy. Those who are skeptical that 
automation is a net job killer point to some key economic statistics.
84
 The unem-
ployment rate has fallen to historic lows, and employers in parts of the country 
 
79. See id. at 6. 
80. See Freeman, supra note 7, at 1, 6-7. 
81. See Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 43, at 33; see also Josh Zumbrun, How Rich and Poor Spend 
(and Earn) Their Money, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 12:38 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com 
/economics/2015/04/06/how-the-rich-and-poor-spend-and-earn-their-money [https://
perma.cc/EE8Y-PE38] (noting that the poor spend a disproportionate share of their income 
on food and housing, while the rich spend more on entertainment and ﬁnancial products). 
82. See Joanne Kimberlin, ‘Full-Closet Effect’ Puts Damper on Consumer Spending, Retail Consultant 
Says, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIB. BUS. NEWS (Feb. 10, 2002), https://www.highbeam.com/doc
/1G1-82735497.html [https://perma.cc/WCL8-WABK]. 
83. See Erik Sherman, Automation Won’t Create New Jobs Like Technology Did in the Past, FORBES 
(Dec. 17, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2016/12/17/automation-has 
-created-more-jobs-in-the-past-but-will-it-now [https://perma.cc/4R3M-RNZF]. 
84. See Autor, supra note 14, at 5-9; Furman, supra note 37, at 1 (arguing “that the economic impact 
of AI will [not] be very different from previous technological advances”). 
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are encountering labor shortages.
85
  Those skeptics also point to sluggish 
productivity growth in recent years. Stated simply: “If automation were rapidly 
accelerating, labor productivity and capital investment would also be surging as 
fewer workers and more technology did the work. But labor productivity and 
capital investment have actually decelerated in the 2000s.”
86
 The coexistence of 
sluggish productivity growth and highly visible advances in automation tech-
nology is puzzling to many observers.
87
 It could be that workers are being di-
verted into less productive jobs in the protean but zero-sum quest for market 
share, as Tyler Cowen has suggested.
88
 Or it could just be that the future impact 




On the other hand, one might see harbingers of future job losses in two well-
documented historical trends. The ﬁrst is the long-term decline in labor-force 
participation—for young and elderly men,
90
  and, since the 1950s, for prime 
working-age men.
91
 (Women’s workforce participation has obviously increased 
 
85. Binyamin Appelbaum, Lack of Workers, Not Work, Weighs on the Nation’s Economy, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/us/politics/utah-economy-jobs.html 
[https://perma.cc/2T8X-FK7S]. 
86. Editorial, No, Robots Aren’t Killing the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/opinion/no-robots-arent-killing-the-american-dream.html 
[https://perma.cc/J36Y-ZGWN]. The editorial cites data from the Economic Policy Institute. 
See also Mishel & Bivens, supra note 20. 
87. As Larry Summers put it, “Any fully-satisfactory synthetic view has to reconcile those two 
observations. I have not heard them satisfactorily reconciled. This is something we have to 
ﬁgure out.” Larry Summers, Former Dir., Nat’l Econ. Council, Remarks at the Brookings In-
stitute’s “Future of Work” Panel (Feb. 19, 2015), http://larrysummers.com/2015/02/23/the 
-future-of-jobs [https://perma.cc/JN97-QS43]. 
88. Cowen points to the proliferation of jobs in branding and marketing: “[M]achines are not 
effective at persuading, at developing advertising campaigns, at branding products or corpo-
rations, or at greeting you at the door in a charming manner . . . . Those activities will remain 
the province of human beings for a long time to come.” Tyler Cowen, In a Robot Economy, All 
Humans Will Be Marketers, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (July 26, 2017, 1:16 PM), https://www 
.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-26/in-a-robot-economy-all-humans-will-be 
-marketers [https://perma.cc/Q9G5-KPJV]. Those activities do not enhance productivity be-
cause they do not produce anything; they reﬂect a “zero- or negative-sum game” in which 
“[e]ach business tries to pull customers away from the other brands.” Id. It is questionable 
whether those jobs can sustain a healthy economy over the longer run. Id. 
89. According to Yogi Berra, Niels Bohr, and an ancient Danish proverb. It’s Difficult to Make Pre-
dictions, Especially About the Future, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Oct. 20, 2013), https:// 
quoteinvestigator.com/2013/10/20/no-predict [https://perma.cc/B437-B7MS]. 
90. See GORDON, supra note 26, at 250-53. 
91. See The Long-Term Decline in Prime-Age Male Labor Force Participation, WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL 
ECON. ADVISERS 7 (June 2016) [hereinafter Long-Term Decline], https://obamawhitehouse 
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over that period, though it has fallen since 2000.
92
) Nationwide, 12% of men 
ages 25 to 54, and 17% of those with only a high school degree or less, were out 
of the labor force in 2015; that compares to 2% and 3%, respectively, in 1954.
93
 
The second trend is a long-term decline in working hours per employee. On one 
recent accounting, hours of work per employee across nonagricultural sectors 
have dropped from nearly sixty hours per week in the 1890s to just under thirty-
ﬁve hours per week in 2010.
94
 In short, automation has a long history of enabling 
the production of more goods and services with fewer total hours of human la-
bor. Those who now predict signiﬁcant net job losses due to automation, far 
from ignoring history, merely posit a continuation and acceleration of those his-
torical trends. 
D. Should We Welcome or Worry About a Future with Much Less Work? 
If the coming wave of automation does enable greater economic output with 
less need for human labor, why not celebrate? Most humans throughout modern 
history have aspired to a life with more leisure and less toil. The demise of child 
labor, the advent of the forty-hour workweek, and the rise of retirement are 
among the greatest joint achievements of organized labor and modern industrial 
capitalism, with automation playing a starring role. Why not press for further 
reductions in the time that humans must devote to paid work, and wider sharing 
of the work that remains? 
This very question was hotly debated among New Dealers and labor leaders 
in the 1930s, and again after the all-hands-on-deck wartime period.
95
 Notably, 
the relatively few women who were active in that debate tended to favor a con-
tinued campaign to reduce work time.
96




92. See Sandra E. Black et al., The Recent Decline in Women’s Labor Force Participation, BROOKINGS 
(Oct. 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/es_10192017 
_decline_womens_labor_force_participation_blackschanzenbach.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4YTT-8M38]. 
93. Long-Term Decline, supra note 91, at 2. 
94. GORDON, supra note 26, at 258-59. That is across all sectors, including agriculture. The decline 
before World War II mainly reﬂects the reduced workweek and the advent of vacations; after 
World War II, it reﬂects partly the entry of women into the workforce and the rise of part-
time jobs. Id. at 259-60. 
95. See HUNNICUTT, supra note 9; BENJAMIN HUNNICUTT, WORK WITHOUT END: ABANDONING 
SHORTER HOURS FOR THE RIGHT TO WORK 147-50 (1988) [hereinafter HUNNICUTT, WORK 
WITHOUT END]. 
96. See HUNNICUTT, supra note 9, at 150. 
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organized labor and progressive thinkers and policy makers opted to press in-
stead for more work, including through public job creation, and higher in-
comes.
97
 The goal of reducing hours of work, which had animated organized 
labor for the better part of a century, gave way to a goal of “full employment,” 
with the government on call as needed to employ surplus workers.
98
 
Today, with the prospect of net job losses from automation, that debate may 
be reopening, at least on the left. The idea of a federal job guarantee has gained 
new traction,
99
 while others call for a return to the agenda of less work and more 
leisure.
100
 The latter has some obvious appeal. Imagine, for example, a world in 
which everyone could meet their basic economic needs while working no more 
than thirty hours per week and forty weeks per year, with access to health care, 
basic income, educational opportunities throughout one’s life, and ample public 
goods of all kinds. That would be, if not utopian, a more egalitarian and less 
market-centric world than we have now. Indeed, it might require a radical trans-
formation, or even the end, of capitalism as we know it.
101
 If that is one’s ideal 
vision of the future, then one might aim to accelerate the replacement of human 
labor with technology while agitating for the radical social and political changes 
that would be required to bring about this more egalitarian distribution of in-
come, work, and leisure.
102
 
But others who would welcome a world of less work might still fear large-
scale net job destruction in the near or medium term. Given our existing political 
and institutional landscape, a decline in the demand for human labor threatens 
to leave many people not with fewer hours of work and decent pay, but with no 
regular paid work at all and too little income to live a decent life. If that is what 
a future of less work looks like, then it would be perverse to characterize it as one 
 
97. See HUNNICUTT, WORK WITHOUT END, supra note 95, at 309-12. 
98. HUNNICUTT, supra note 9, at 148-65. 
99. See sources cited supra note 10. 
100. See, e.g., ANDRÉ GORZ, FAREWELL TO THE WORKING CLASS: AN ESSAY ON POST-INDUSTRIAL 
SOCIALISM (Michael Sonenscher trans., 1982); NICK SRNICEK & ALEX WILLIAMS, INVENTING 
THE FUTURE: POSTCAPITALISM AND A WORLD WITHOUT WORK (2015); KATHI WEEKS, THE 
PROBLEM WITH WORK: FEMINISM, MARXISM, ANTIWORK POLITICS, AND POSTWORK IMAGI-
NARIES (2011). These writers have predecessors among nineteenth-century social thinkers. 
See, e.g., EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD (New Am. Library 1960) (1888); J.A. ETZ-
LER, THE PARADISE WITHIN THE REACH OF ALL MEN, WITHOUT LABOUR, BY POWERS OF NA-
TURE AND MACHINERY (London, John Brooks 1836). 
101. See Randall Collins, The End of Middle-Class Work: No More Escapes, in IMMANUEL WALLER-
STEIN ET AL., DOES CAPITALISM HAVE A FUTURE? 37, 51 (2013). 
102. See, e.g., SRNICEK & WILLIAMS, supra note 100, at 107-118 (calling for signiﬁcant wage increases 
as a way to accelerate automation and the destruction of jobs while increasing the returns to 
labor). 
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of greater leisure. Leisure without an adequate source of household income is 
just the poverty and malaise of long-term unemployment. 
The economic consequences of unemployment—periodic and long-term—
only begin with the loss of wages. For much of the twentieth century, many so-
cial entitlements were bundled together in a concept that Harry Arthurs has 
called “industrial citizenship”—that is, “an employment-related system of enti-
tlements which would protect workers against arbitrary treatment by their em-
ployer and against the vicissitudes of the economy, old age and illness.”
103
 More 
than its European counterparts, the American social model delivers many of the 
material requisites of a decent life—not only income, but also retirement security 




Outside the highly regulated employment nexus, and above a rather stingy 
safety net for the poor,
105
 individuals are largely left to the tender mercies of the 
market, armed with whatever individual bargaining power they can muster 
given the intersection of their skill set with changing market conditions. Auto-
mation threatens the future reach not only of the so-called “standard employ-
ment relationship”—the long-term, full-time jobs that were the foundation of 
twentieth-century American prosperity, partial though it was—but of paid work 
more broadly. 
The problem with a signiﬁcant loss of paid work—if that is what we are fac-
ing—is not merely an economic one. Useful work is central not only to most 
people’s identity, but also to our social and political life. The experience of shared 
work fosters social interaction and social integration, solidarity and friendship, 
 
103. H.W. Arthurs, The New Economy and the New Legality: Industrial Citizenship and the Future of 
Labour Arbitration, 7 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 46 (1999); see also H.W. Arthurs, Devel-
oping Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada’s Second Century, 45 CANADIAN B. REV. 786 
(1967). 
104. See David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1601 (1996); 
Katherine V.W. Stone, A Fatal Mismatch: Employer-Centric Beneﬁts in a Boundaryless World, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 451 (2007). 
105. See Elise Gould & Hilary Wething, U.S. Poverty Rates Higher, Safety Net Weaker than in Peer 
Countries, ECON. POL’Y INST. 5-7 (2012), https://www.epi.org/publication/ib339-us-poverty 
-higher-safety-net-weaker [https://perma.cc/9C4K-Q6D8]. “Social spending” in the United 
States is lower than the average of OECD countries (as a percentage of GDP), and much lower 
than in comparably rich developed countries in Western Europe. See Social Spending, OECD, 
https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/social-spending.htm#indicator-chart [https://perma.cc
/HT68-Q439]. 
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and cooperation and compromise amidst conﬂict.
106
 Work and workplace rela-
tionships are a far more proliﬁc source of communal, cooperative, and collegial 
ties than neighborhoods or other associations; and those ties play a crucial role 
in maintaining the social fabric of a diverse society.
107
 If a growing segment of 
the population ﬁnds itself detached from the world of work, that social fabric 
will become even more frayed and our politics even more fraught. I think that 
would be true even if people’s basic material needs were met by something like 
a universal basic income. 
To be sure, people who have or expect to have fulﬁlling and high-status jobs 
(like me and most of my readers) may be inclined to idealize work as a source of 
community and identity. Labor lawyers and scholars in particular may tend to 
romanticize the experience of shared work and solidarity among coworkers. 
Looking ahead, we might need to recalibrate our cultural matrix of values away 
from what one does for a living and toward what one does with one’s life, and 
to reconﬁgure our institutions to enable people to alternate among periods of 




All in all, if we could ensure a reasonably fair distribution of income, leisure, 
and work,
109
 then the growing ability to replace human labor with machines and 
technology would have a far more positive valence. In the meantime, however, 
ours is a society in which most people’s income and economic security, as well as 
their identity, status, and experience of collective effort toward shared aims, are 
all heavily dependent on paid work. That makes the prospect of signiﬁcant net 
job destruction through automation deeply unsettling, even if it is still uncertain. 
If decent paid work grows scarce while most individuals continue to depend 
on paid work for their livelihood, then we face a feverishly competitive and 
highly polarized future—a high-stakes tournament in which the winners will in-
clude ﬁrms with the talent, agility, and perhaps ruthlessness to exploit labor-




106. See generally CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003) (arguing that the extent of sociability and coop-
eration among relatively diverse coworkers makes workplace ties crucial in a diverse demo-
cratic society). 
107. See id. 
108. See WEEKS, supra note 100 (challenging the centrality of work to identity, morality, and social 
organization). 
109. As in Thomas More’s original Utopia, as it happens. See History of Basic Income, supra note 8. 
110. See BRYNJOLFSSON & MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 3. 
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is in the nature of tournaments that losers outnumber winners, and this tourna-
ment will be true to form.
111
 Firms in competitive markets will lose out if they 
continue to employ people to do things that machines can do more efficiently, 
and if they lack the human talent and organizational agility to constantly adapt 
to and adopt new technology. Far more importantly, people will lose out if they 
fail to acquire the high-end, hard-to-automate skills that will be in greatest de-
mand, if they lack the resources and opportunities needed to acquire those skills, 
or if they crumple under the pressure of the tournament itself. There will be 
many fewer of the decent midlevel jobs that require diligent completion of 
mostly routine tasks, and that have long sustained the broad middle of the work-
ing population. 
Perhaps paradoxically, many workers at both the top and the bottom of this 
more automated and polarized economy might ﬁnd themselves working very 
long hours, albeit for diametrically opposed reasons. Those with scarce skills and 
high marginal productivity, as well as their employers, might rationally converge 
around long hours of work (as we already see now). By contrast, some low-wage 
workers will scramble to work longer hours or multiple jobs just to make ends 
meet. 
One cannot help but blanch at how much will be demanded of the human 
beings who hope to come out on top of this tournament. They will need to be 
intelligent, adaptable, and entrepreneurial about their working lives, and both 
willing and able to continually retrain and redeploy their talents to meet the ever-
changing demands of technological innovation and dynamic market condi-
tions.
112
 That in turn will require a high level of psychological resilience and tol-
erance for risk and change, as well as a strong basic education that equips them 
to learn how to learn. Not everyone is blessed by nature and nurture with the 
makings of those traits, and not everyone in our egregiously unequal society has 
an opportunity to cultivate them. Moreover, there is little room in this scenario 
for a balanced life, one that is not dominated by the competition to get and stay 
ahead in an increasingly polarized labor market. 
 
111. The kind of tournament I have in mind here is of the “winner-take-all” variety. See ROBERT 
FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: WHY THE FEW AT THE TOP GET SO 
MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF US (1996). 
112. The market-backed injunction to be entrepreneurial about one’s own life and work is a signa-
ture feature of neoliberalism, for its critics. See WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEO-
LIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 22 (2015). 
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E. Alternative Futures and Why the Pace of Automation Matters 
With more than a little bit of simpliﬁcation, the foregoing account suggests 
several possible futures for workers.
113
 First, those who trust in the market dy-
namics of creative destruction expect the future to look much like the present, 
but with more and better stuff. They believe that job losses from automation, 
though temporarily disruptive, will be offset by new and better jobs that satisfy 
evolving, and bottomless, consumer appetites.
114
 But this vision is beginning to 
look far too complacent, at least on the view of the MGI economists. Without an 
ambitious suite of mitigating and stimulating policies, or perhaps even with 
those policies, job losses are likely to mount.
115
 
If trust in creative destruction proves misplaced, and society fails to “step-
up” investments in training, job creation, and the rest, then we might face a sec-
ond, deeply dystopian future of mass immiseration and a growing concentration 
of wealth at the top. Workers without in-demand skills will compete, and drive 
down wages, for the jobs that machines cannot do as well or as cheaply but that 
most humans can do. The winners—those who make or own the technology or 
whose scarce skills are augmented by technology—will win access to private en-
claves of privilege fortiﬁed against the rage and resentment of the losers.
116
 Let 
us posit that this is a future that is worth striving to avoid. 
MGI’s “step-up scenario” suggests a third possible future. If ﬁrms and gov-
ernments do rise to the challenge of automation by investing heavily in training 
and education, income support, infrastructure, and social services, then job cre-
ation can keep pace with job destruction and we can enjoy continuing growth 
and prosperity. Some will embrace this vision of supercharged capitalism, while 
others will recoil—even apart from profound doubts about the environmental 
sustainability of perpetual economic growth.
117
 In any case, this vision may be 
 
113. My terminology here unintentionally echoes that of PETER FRASE, FOUR FUTURES: LIFE AFTER 
CAPITALISM (2016). But his futures are more starkly futuristic and (deliberately) less tethered 
to realism than those sketched here. 
114. See GORDON, supra note 26, at 593-604; Autor, supra note 14, at 9-14; Robots Won’t Take Your 
Job—They’ll Help Make Room for Meaningful Work Instead, QUARTZ (Mar. 15, 2017), 
https://qz.com/932417/robots-wont-take-your-job-theyll-help-make-room-for-meaningful
-work-instead [https://perma.cc/V792-5D23]. 
115. That is the MGI’s “trendline scenario,” in which society fails to undertake the institutional 
responses that will be needed to stimulate job growth, promote redeployment of workers, and 
cushion losses. See MGI, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained, supra note 70, at 14. 
116. See generally FRASE, supra note 113 (offering a speculative portrait of what this future might 
entail). 
117. The literature on the tension between sustainability and economic growth is large. For an 
early articulation of the conﬂict, see DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH 
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out of reach if estimates of job creation prove too sanguine, or if the pace of au-
tomation is on the high side of current estimates. 
A fourth vision of the future is utopian and perhaps postcapitalist: automa-
tion will banish scarcity, and a benevolent state will orchestrate the production 
of ample public goods and the distribution of resources so that everyone can live 
a decent life with little or no paid work. Many readers will dismiss this vision as 
hopelessly unrealistic; others may reject the very idea of a postcapitalist, non-
market economy; or they may shudder at the prospect of a society and of human 
lives that are not anchored by shared work. But even those who ﬁnd this vision 
both attractive and attainable should concede that it would require a radical 
transformation of politics and social institutions, and a raft of ameliorative policy 
measures, to fend off the dystopian alternatives. The challenge will be much 
greater if automation proceeds faster than expected. 
A ﬁfth possible future would steer between the last two paths—a “Goldi-
locks” future, if you will—toward a fair distribution of (less) paid work, leisure, 
and income. Shorter workweeks and access to periodic leaves for family, recrea-
tion, education, and civic work would be coupled with universal basic social en-
titlements and ample public goods.
118
 Here, too, the faster the automation and 
destruction of existing jobs proceed, the harder it would be to construct this 
more egalitarian and humane future. 
This last vision might appeal to many readers, as it does to me. Others will 
disagree as to what is desirable and what is achievable. (Indeed, one dimension 
of an attractive future, in my view, is the room it makes for divergent individual 
 
(1972). For a recent overview and intervention, see Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, A Third 
Option for Climate Policy Within Potential Limits to Growth, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE (Feb. 1, 
2017), https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate3113.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ57-4Y9G]. 
118. This future would build on basic features of social policy in most European countries, which 
are grounded in a belief that it is necessary to “constrain the free market in the name of the 
public interest” in order to lay the foundation of a just society. TONY JUDT, ILL FARES THE LAND 
75 (2010); see also PETER BALDWIN, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY: CLASS BASES OF THE 
EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE 1875-1975 (1990) (examining the social bases of the European wel-
fare state); GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN: THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990) 
(distinguishing three major types of welfare state in advanced Western countries). Some con-
temporary American thinkers look to the ideals of European social democracy for both moral 
inspiration and concrete policy ideas in their effort to construct a humane political economy 
and respond to challenges such as automation. See, e.g., STEPHEN HILL, EUROPE’S PROMISE: 
WHY THE EUROPEAN WAY IS THE BEST HOPE IN AN INSECURE AGE (2010); LANE KENWORTHY, 
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AMERICA (2015); LESSONS FROM EUROPE?: WHAT AMERICANS CAN 
LEARN FROM EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICIES (R. Daniel Kelemen ed., 2015). In the meantime, Eu-
ropean social democracy faces its own challenges on political, ideological, and economic 
fronts. For a range of perspectives on these challenges, see THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
IN EUROPE (Michael Keating & David McCrone eds., 2013). The comparative perspective on 
the challenge of automation to the future of work is beyond the scope of this Article, but I 
plan to take it up in future work. 
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choices about the ideal mix of, and trade-offs among, labor, leisure, and income.) 
It seems clear, however, that avoiding dystopia and reaching one of the better 
futures—better, that is, for the overwhelming majority of the population—
would require major changes both in policies and in the state of our politics. 
That process will also take time, and could careen off the rails—if it hasn’t al-
ready done so—if job losses and economic misery and resentments start to 
mount. It is imperative that citizens and political leaders begin to focus on these 
alternative futures, and avoid simply falling into the dystopian future by de-
fault—or by complacently trusting in creative destruction, which could lead to 
the same end if this time is indeed different. 
Across a wide range of views about the likelihood and desirability of a society 
with much less work, the pace of automation-based job destruction is a critical 
factor. Public policy and public spending will have to play a large role in fostering 
new job creation and in equipping workers for those new jobs. But the faster 
jobs are destroyed, the harder it will be for public and private job creation and 
worker retraining to keep pace. Faster job destruction will yield more wrenching 
social consequences and less hospitable conditions for a serious political debate 
about spreading the gains and mitigating the losses from automation. 
A prescription of slower automation will be anathema to those who tout au-
tomation’s role in economic growth, prosperity, and innovation, and in improv-
ing human welfare. Automation both substitutes for human labor and comple-
ments human labor; and it both destroys jobs and improves efficiency, quality, 
safety, and sustainability. Is it possible to slow down automation’s job-destruc-
tive side without sacriﬁcing its other beneﬁts? I believe it is possible to some 
degree, and will try to show how in the pages that follow. 
Many bodies of law are relevant to the pace of automation.
119
 I seek here to 
address how employment law might affect the pace of automation-related job 
losses, and how that body of law might best respond to the challenge of automa-
tion.
120
 To that end, it is important ﬁrst to situate automation among other on-
going changes in the organization of work that have lately preoccupied labor 
scholars, policy makers, and advocates. That is because the prevailing prescrip-
tions for responding to those changes within labor and employment law might 
 
119. For example, very recent work has explored the impact of the law governing intellectual prop-
erty and innovation, see Camilla A. Hrdy, Intellectual Property and the End of Work, 71 FLA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3011735, and tax law, see Ryan Abbott 
& Bret Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 145 (2018). 
120. I largely set aside here the role of “labor law”—that is, the law of collective labor relations and 
trade unions—and how it might affect automation and vice versa. I intend to return to this 
topic in future work. 
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counterproductively speed up automation-related job losses and thus exacerbate 
the challenge of automation. 
i i .  how automation alters the landscape of work and 
confounds efforts to shore up the fortress of 
employment 
The challenge that automation poses to the future of work is in many ways 
continuous with the more familiar challenges of “ﬁssuring”—the growing pro-
clivity of ﬁrms to outsource, offshore, or otherwise contract out their labor needs 
to other ﬁrms and individuals. In particular, the managerial decisions behind 
both ﬁssuring and automation reﬂect similar causal forces, including the mani-
fold costs associated with direct employment of human labor. Yet automation is 
also different in basic ways that confound prevailing strategies for coping with 
the challenge of ﬁssuring. 
A. Fissuring and the Growth of Outsourcing, Offshoring, and Platform Work 
“Fissuring” is the now-prevalent term, coined by David Weil, for the migra-
tion of many jobs away from the proﬁtable branded corporations that reign at 
the top of the economy.
121
 Many jobs that were done in the 1950s and 1960s 
within those large integrated ﬁrms—especially jobs in manufacturing and ser-
vices such as maintenance, cleaning, security, and food services—are now con-
tracted out to outside ﬁrms. Some outside ﬁrms supply specialized services or 
components; others, like temporary employment agencies, supply nothing but 
labor; still others, like franchisees, take over all daily operations subject to stand-
ards set by the lead ﬁrm. Across the board, however, workers usually end up 
worse off.
122
 Instead of enjoying the relatively high wages, beneﬁts, promotion 
ladders, and formal or informal job security that used to prevail even at the bot-
tom of lead ﬁrms’ “internal labor markets,” many workers are now concentrated 




121. See generally WEIL, supra note 23 (describing the causes and effects of corporations’ growing 
tendency to supply labor inputs through outsourcing, franchising, and contracting). 
122. For a concise explanation of why that is so, see David Weil, Income Inequality, Wage Determi-
nation, and the Fissured Workplace, in AFTER PIKETTY: THE AGENDA FOR ECONOMICS AND IN-
EQUALITY, supra note 7, at 209, 224-27. 
123. The terms “lead ﬁrm” and “supplier” serve here as shorthand for dynamics that recur across 
multiple layers of a supply chain. A large logistics ﬁrm is a supplier for other lead ﬁrms, but 
it is a lead ﬁrm relative to its own suppliers. But not all lead ﬁrms are created equal. Firms 
with a valuable consumer brand that commands a price premium (such as Apple, Inc.) have 
capabilities and vulnerabilities that business-to-business ﬁrms generally do not. 
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Lower wages and widespread labor-standards violations among suppliers in 
many sectors are due in part to intense cost-based competition that sharpens the 
incentive to cut corners. In addition, some suppliers use or purport to use inde-
pendent contractors, who are not covered by employment laws. And many sup-
pliers invest little or nothing in compliance and have little physical capital or 
public reputation at stake should they break the law or become insolvent. These 
conditions all contribute to the decline of wages and the erosion of labor stand-
ards that have accompanied the shift of work away from branded, publicly traded 
lead ﬁrms. Fissuring enables lead ﬁrms to secure lower labor costs as well as a 
measure of insulation from the stench of the unlawful practices that may con-
tribute to those lower costs. 
Two kinds of ﬁssuring have drawn especially anxious attention from scholars 
and advocates: the offshoring of jobs to overseas suppliers, and the splintering 
of jobs into “gigs” that are or purport to be outside the employment nexus. 
China and Uber thus both stand for larger trends in the world of work. 
In seeking to reduce production costs, many ﬁrms have contracted out labor-
intensive tasks to low-cost producers in developing countries. As a result, 
China’s share of global manufacturing output grew from less than 3% in 1990 to 
nearly 25% in 2015.
124
 India, with its large reservoir of English-language skills, 
has become the epicenter of outsourced information-based services.
125
 The cost 
savings from transnational outsourcing stem partly from lower wages and 
weaker regulatory institutions and trade unions in these much poorer countries, 
and partly from the same forces that depress labor standards among domestic 
suppliers: cost-based competition in a concentrated low-wage, low-proﬁt envi-
ronment. Offshoring is one exit option that enables ﬁrms to escape collective and 
regulatory efforts to protect workers or improve their wages or working condi-
tions in more advanced economies. 
Uber represents another kind of ﬁssuring and another exit option—one that 




124. See Made in China?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www. economist.com/news/leaders
/21646204-asias-dominance-manufacturing-will-endure-will-make-development-harder 
-others-made [https://perma.cc/FAW9-PQUK]. 
125. India Tops 2016 Outsourcing Index, HINDU BUS. LINE (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www 
.thehindubusinessline.com/info-tech/india-tops-2016-outsourcing-index/article8097482
.ece [https://perma.cc/3TE5-LBWH]. 
126. Some aspects of the “gig economy” echo past patterns of industrial piecework or the old gar-
ment industry’s “putting out system” for the service economy. See Matthew W. Finkin, Be-
clouded Work, Beclouded Workers in Historical Perspective, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 603, 604-
11 (2016). 
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Drivers, writers, accountants, cleaners, artists, carpenters, care workers, web de-
signers, software programmers, ﬁtness instructors, and therapists are among 
those attempting to piece together a living from a patchwork of short-term en-
gagements, mostly as freelancers, in today’s economy.
127
 Highly valuable plat-
forms like Uber, for their part, purport to produce nothing but the software that 
links consumers with the services and servants they seek. Some of these plat-
forms induce workers to bid against each other in real time. And where the work 
can be done remotely—as with the microtasks posted on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk
128
—the bidders may include poor workers in developing countries. Some 
platforms thus allow ﬁrms to exit both the employment relationship and high-
wage labor markets. 
Platform-based work is one small but salient aspect of the larger practice of 
outsourcing work to individual independent contractors without any of the re-
sponsibilities and burdens that attend the employment relationship. Those re-
sponsibilities and burdens, and the corresponding workers’ rights and entitle-
ments, are not merely passed down the line to less visible, proﬁtable, and capable 
employers; they are vaporized. 
Some freelancers prosper, and some value the greater autonomy and ﬂexibil-
ity of independent work.
129
 But for many U.S. workers and their families, the 
devolution of stable and decently paid jobs into insecure and undependable con-
tingent work and gigs is a socioeconomic disaster. That is partly because of the 
loss of the economic security, beneﬁts, and social insurance programs attached 
to employment, either by law, contract, or widespread practice, especially in large 
companies. The shift of work from lead ﬁrms to leaner and meaner supplier 
ﬁrms, and from long-term, full-time employment to contingent work and gigs, 
 
127. One large recent study found that 20-30% of working-age individuals in the United States 
and Europe engaged in some “independent work.” McKinsey Glob. Inst., Independent Work: 
Choice, Necessity, and the Gig Economy, MCKINSEY & COMPANY 26 (2016) [hereinafter MGI, 
Study on Independent Work], https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured 
%20Insights/Employment%20and%20Growth/Independent%20work%20Choice 
%20necessity%20and%20the%20gig%20economy/Independent-Work-Choice-necessity 
-and-the-gig-economy-Full-report.ashx [https://perma.cc/RE86-CFZ6]. Of those, most 
said they did so by choice, either for their primary source of income (30%) or for supplemental 
income (40%). The remainder said they did “independent work” out of necessity, either as 
their primary source of income (though they would prefer a “traditional job”) (14%), or for 
supplemental income (16%). Id. at ix. 
128. Amazon Mechanical Turk, https://www.mturk.com [https://perma.cc/NF52-A9UN]. 
129. See MGI, Study on Independent Work, supra note 127, at 7. See generally ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, 
THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITAL-
ISM (2016) (detailing some virtues of the sharing economy). 
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B. Three Common Causes of Automation and Fissuring: Technology, Heightened 
Competition, and the Costs of Employing People 
Before turning to what makes automation different from ﬁssuring, let us ﬁrst 
take note of three common causal forces behind these developments: technology, 
more competitive product and capital markets, and the costs of human labor. 
Technology—obviously the essence of automation—has played a crucial role 
in nearly every aspect of ﬁssuring, including both outsourcing to lower-wage 
countries and platform work.
131
  In short, technology lowers the transaction 
costs associated with explicit contracting for goods and services, or of “buying” 
versus “making” necessary inputs.
132
 It enables lead ﬁrms to disintegrate prod-
ucts and processes into component parts, to set precise standards and speciﬁca-
tions, and to monitor performance and outputs of lower-cost and remote outside 
suppliers. Technology, in the form of container ships and bar-coding, enables 
Walmart to track goods from a factory in Guangdong Province in China to a 
store in Lexington, Kentucky.
133
 Technology enables Apple to maintain scrupu-
lous quality standards while tapping into the much cheaper Chinese labor mar-
ket. And it enables Uber, without directly supervising drivers, to monitor them, 
connect them with customers, and capture a large share of the fares.
134
 
Technology is just the means, however, and not the motivation for these de-
velopments. Fissuring and automation are driven in part by supercharged global 
capital markets, in which billions of dollars move across the world in microsec-
onds, and globalized product markets, in which ﬁrms from across the world 
 
130. See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION 
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004) (describing the changes in the American workplace 
over time); WEIL, supra note 23 (same); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: 
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 
(2001) (same). 
131. See WEIL, supra note 23, at 54-58, 60-63, 167-74 (detailing the mechanisms by which ﬁssuring 
cuts costs). 
132. See id. at 60-63, 171-74. 
133. The transformative impact of container ships and bar codes on global supply chains is chron-
icled in Witold Rybcyznski, Shipping News, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 10, 2006), https://
www.nybooks.com/articles/2006/08/10/shipping-news [https://perma.cc/23LB-CVU6]. 
134. Whether Uber can do so without being the legal employer of those drivers is a hotly contested 
issue, as discussed below. See infra notes 175-182 and accompanying text. 




 Firms that falter in the pursuit of cheaper means of 
producing goods and services risk losing both investors and market share to 
more efficient producers. The basic underlying dynamics of price, supply, and 
demand are hardwired into the market economy, although deliberate policy de-
cisions have done much to foster the growth of transnational ﬁrms, networks, 
and supply chains, and to facilitate the movement of goods, services, and capital 
across national boundaries.
136
 Technology has obviously accelerated all of those 
movements. But ﬁrms use technology to eliminate or outsource jobs only when 
doing so generates higher returns to capital through lower production costs, 
higher productivity, or both. 
Automation is thus part of a larger menu of options by which those who own 
or manage capital seek to maximize their returns. Those who supply the robots 
and the algorithms that replace human labor and destroy jobs are responding to 
demand from ﬁrms seeking more proﬁtable ways to produce other goods and 
services. All of the related trends that fall under the rubric of ﬁssuring—the de-
velopment of far-ﬂung supply chains, domestic outsourcing of labor-intensive 
functions, franchising of food service and hospitality services, and the rise of 
platform-based service providers—reﬂect the growing ability of lead ﬁrms to se-
cure labor inputs without directly employing people. And if robots or algorithms 
can supply those inputs even more quickly, more reliably, more cheaply, or with 
less risk, then lead ﬁrms will turn to them instead of human labor. 
That points to a third factor driving ﬁssuring and automation: the effort to 
reduce or avoid the costs and risks of employing human beings. For many labor 
scholars and advocates, it is distressing to realize the extent to which this factor 
drives trends in the organization and automation of work. Investment banker 
Steven Berkenfeld made the point in vivid terms at a 2015 Department of Labor 
(DOL) conference on the future of work: 
As I talk to companies, yes, it’s about labor savings, but that’s just the 
starting point. It’s also about indirect cost savings . . . . It’s about health 
care liabilities, lawsuits[,] and insurance and disabilities beneﬁts. 
 
135. Some observers call the resulting economy “hypercapitalism.” See, e.g., Marina Vujnovic, Hy-
percapitalism, in 2 THE WILEY-BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GLOBALIZATION 978 (George 
Ritzer ed., 2012). 
136. See generally DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE WORLD ECONOMY (2011) (critiquing the excesses of liberalization of trade and ﬁnance 
and analyzing their consequences). 
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And . . . people need people. There is a whole management infrastruc-




Worse yet from the perspective of labor advocates, managers report that “people 
are a pain to manage”: 
They have to be identiﬁed and recruited, hired [and] trained. They want 
performance reviews and promotions. They take vacations, they get sick, 
their kids get sick, their parents get sick, they get pregnant; they get in-
jured on the job. Sometimes they don’t get along with each other. They 
sue for harassment. They need all kinds of insurance and beneﬁts. They 
want raises and career development, and then sometimes they quit. Then 
you have to start it all over again . . . . [People] have needs, issues, and 
ambitions. And perhaps most signiﬁcantly from a CEO’s standpoint they 
do dumb things. They give bribes and kickbacks, they discriminate and 
harass, they expose companies to cyber-attacks, they commit . . . acts of 
negligence, misconduct, and violence, and sometimes they even deliber-
ately sabotage. They create liabilities, they damage brands, and they 
sometimes get CEOs ﬁred.
138
 
Berkenfeld’s bottom line brought an audible gasp from the mostly labor-
friendly audience at the DOL conference. “[S]ome CEOs . . . will do anything 
possible, they’ll explore all other alternatives so as not to hire another full-time 
employee.”
139
 Putting the point more succinctly in another venue, Berkenfeld 
reports that CEOs these days ask, “Can I automate it? If not, can I outsource it? 
If not, can I give it to an independent contractor?” In other words, “[h]iring an 
employee is the last resort.”
140
 
The role of labor costs in outsourcing and other forms of ﬁssuring is well 
established.
141
 Their role in spurring automation can come as no surprise. A 
basic postulate of labor economics holds that increases in the cost of labor—
whether due to market forces, legal mandates, or collective bargaining—tend to 
 
137. Steven Berkenfeld, Managing Dir., Barclays Capital, Opportunities and Challenges, Presen-
tation at the U.S. Department of Labor Conference on the Future of Work (Dec. 10, 2015) 
(transcript on ﬁle with author). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Olivier Garret, How the Coming Wave of Job Automation Will Affect You and the U.S., FORBES 
(Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviergarret/2017/02/23/how-the-coming 
-wave-of-job-automation-will-affect-you-and-the-us [https://perma.cc/6KGV-AKLC]. 
141. See, e.g., WEIL, supra note 23. 
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lead ﬁrms to substitute capital, including technology, for labor.
142
 That substi-
tution is bound to accelerate with the growing capabilities and falling cost of 
labor-saving technology. 
Some labor costs, and thus some part of the motivation for both automation 
and ﬁssuring, stem from employment laws.
143
 Some laws add predictable direct 
costs, such as payroll taxes for workers’ compensation and unemployment in-
surance, Social Security, and Medicare, which can add 18 to 26% to the base sal-
ary cost.
144
 Minimum wage rates obviously affect direct labor costs at the bottom 
of the labor market.
145
 Overtime laws and the pay-or-play employer mandates 
of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)—as long as they exist—may increase direct 
costs much further up the wage scale.
146
 Labor economists generally assume that 
employees bear the cost of these taxes and mandates in the form of lower 
wages—down to the point at which minimum wage laws block further wage re-
ductions.
147
 If that is so, then these laws mainly add to the cost of employing 
 
142. RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984). 
143. Charlotte Alexander has explored ﬁrms’ ability to restructure work to avoid the costs of legal 
mandates—for example, by using independent contractors or reducing employee work hours 
below a minimum threshold for coverage (e.g., the Affordable Care Act’s employer pay-or-
play obligations accrue only for employees working more than thirty hours per week). See 
Charlotte S. Alexander, Legal Avoidance and the Restructuring of Work, in THE STRUCTURING 
OF WORK IN ORGANIZATIONS 311 (Lisa E. Cohen et al. eds., 2016). Automation may be an even 
better legal avoidance strategy. 
144. For a breakdown of the nonwage direct costs of each employee, see Jose Pagliery, You Make 
$70k but Cost Your Boss $88k, CNN MONEY (Feb. 28, 2013, 9:16 AM ET), https://money.cnn
.com/2013/02/28/smallbusiness/salary-beneﬁts/index.html [https://perma.cc/RD5C 
-J4AH]. 
145. On the economic impact of minimum wage levels, see infra Section II.D. 
146. For example, the ACA covers employers with more than ﬁfty employees, but only with regard 
to employees working over thirty hours per week. Most early studies found modest effects on 
employers’ costs and employment levels. See, e.g., Jean Abraham & Anne Beeson Royalty, How 
Has the Affordable Care Act Affected Work and Wages?, LEONARD DAVIS INST. HEALTH ECON. 
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://ldi.upenn.edu/brief/how-has-affordable-care-act-affected-work-and
-wages [https://perma.cc/L59D-BTMS]; Fredric Blavin et al., Monitoring the Impact of the 
Affordable Care Act on Employers, URB. INST. (Oct. 2014), https://www.urban.org/sites/default
/ﬁles/publication/33696/413273-Monitoring-the-Impact-of-the-Affordable-Care-Act-on 
-Employers.PDF [https://perma.cc/BNB5-8NGP]. 
147. See TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION 173-80 (1999); Alan 
B. Krueger & Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Economics of Employer Versus Individual Mandates, 13 
HEALTH AFF. 34 (1994); Lawrence H. Summers, What Can Economics Contribute to Social Pol-
icy?: Some Simple Economics of Mandated Beneﬁts, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 180 (1989); John 
Olson, What Are Payroll Taxes and Who Pays Them?, TAX FOUND. (July 25, 2016), 
https://taxfoundation.org/what-are-payroll-taxes-and-who-pays-them [https://perma.cc
/X4K3-W4G9]. They are more likely to offer slower wage increases to incumbents or lower 
starting wages to new hires. See BEWLEY, supra, at 1, 131. 
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low-wage workers. But evidence is mixed on whether the assumption holds and 
whether employers—whose decisions are at the heart of the matter—believe it.
148
 
Other laws increase the cost of employing people in less predictable ways; they 
are a source of risk. For example, union organizing, strikes, and other activities 
that are protected by federal labor law pose “risks” to ﬁrms;
149
 and ﬁrms pay 
“union avoidance” consultants a lot of money to manage those risks.
150
 
I will focus here on employment laws and liabilities. Consider the bevy of 
employment laws prohibiting discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Liti-
gation under those laws imposes both tangible costs and intangible ones, such 
as harms to reputation and morale. Employees may be on both sides of litigation, 
as when employees or ex-employees sue over other employees’ misconduct, mis-
takes, or misjudgments for which the employer is liable. Employees can mistak-
enly or maliciously trigger corporate liabilities not only under employment laws 
but also under environmental laws, tax and securities laws, consumer protection 
laws, and other laws regulating corporate conduct. Large corporate compliance 
departments, which cost large ﬁrms billions of dollars per year, are devoted to 
avoiding or managing these risks and liabilities (not to mention the risks created 
by managerial malfeasance or brinksmanship).
151
 
Employment laws thus account for part of the cost of employing humans. 
Some legal mandates could yield countervailing productivity gains through 
lower turnover or higher employee morale and motivation. But most of the 
 
148. For evidence that employers in fact bear a large share of payroll taxes, see Daniel S. 
Hamermesh, New Estimates of the Incidence of the Payroll Tax, 45 S. ECON. J. 1208 (1979). On 
employer beliefs regarding who pays for employment taxes, see id. at 1217; and Krueger & 
Reinhardt, supra note 147, at 43. 
149. The direct costs stemming from the labor laws, including the cost of violating those laws, are 
small; but when workers exercise their rights through collective agitation and organizing, the 
costs can be substantial (though only obliquely traceable to the law). 
150. How much they spend is unclear. See Michael Hiltzik, Labor Dept. Finally Closes a Loophole 
Favoring Union-Busters—After 57 Years, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.latimes.com
/business/hiltzik/la-ﬁ-hiltzik-union-busting-20160323-snap-htmlstory.html [https://perma
.cc/N54J-RYXB]; Dave Jamieson, It’s About to Get Harder for Companies to Hide Union-Busting, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2016, 12:01 AM EST), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry
/union-busting-persuader-rule_us_56f1bdcbe4b0c3ef52172770 [https://perma.cc/DB5M 
-BPG4]; Noam Scheiber, Rules to Require Employers to Disclose Use of Anti-Union Consultants, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/business/economy 
/union-labor-regulation-consultant-relationships.html [https://perma.cc/X5WU-6QAH]. 
151. HSBC, for example, anticipated spending $3.3 billion on regulatory and compliance actions 
in 2017 alone. Richard Partington, Banks Trimming Compliance Staff as $321 Billion in Fines 
Abate, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 22, 2017, 8:01 PM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2017-03-23/banks-trimming-compliance-staff-as-321-billion-in-ﬁnes-abate 
[https://perma.cc/B97D-7TXD]. 
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productivity gains associated with higher wages and beneﬁts (according to “ef-
ﬁciency wage” theory) depend on their being voluntary and above what either 
the law or the market demands; that is how employers recruit and retain em-
ployees who might otherwise go elsewhere, and induce reciprocal loyalty in the 
form of higher effort.
152
 That dynamic cannot necessarily be reproduced through 
across-the-board mandates and minimum standards. 
It is hardly a revelation that employment laws add to the cost of employing 
humans. Nor is it a reason to oppose those laws. From a societal standpoint, 
those laws might promote allocative efficiency by mitigating negative externali-
ties or overcoming collective action problems; or they might serve just distribu-
tional ends or other overriding noneconomic values.
153
 But none of those social 
gains undercut ﬁrms’ private incentive to avoid or evade those laws and their 
costs if they can do so. Indeed, both corporate law and ﬁnancial-market pres-
sures virtually compel ﬁrms to minimize these costs if doing so increases returns 
to shareholders.
154
  And increasingly ﬁrms can avoid those costs—in part 
through ﬁssuring, but more completely through automation. 
C. Why Automation Is Different 
Automation is in one sense just another tool in the toolbox for ﬁrms seeking 
to reduce the costs and risks associated with in-house labor. But in other ways it 
is fundamentally different. Rather than separating human workers from those 
who use and proﬁt from their labor, automation replaces human labor inputs 
altogether. Where automation is feasible and cost-effective, it offers the ultimate 
exit from the costs, risks, and hassles of employing people, including those that 
stem from the law of work. 
 
152. See Lawrence F. Katz, Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation, in 1 NBER MACROECO-
NOMICS ANNUAL 1986, at 235, 248 (Stanley Fischer ed., 1986); Michael L. Wachter, Neoclassical 
Labor Economics: Its Implications for Labor and Employment Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 20, 28-29 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael 
L. Wachter eds., 2012). 
153. See Christine Jolls, Employment Law and the Labor Market 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 13230, 2007), https://www.nber.org/papers/w13230 [https://perma.cc
/B6DM-UQNC] (arguing that “[i]n the presence of a market failure, legal intervention 
through employment law may both enhance efficiency and make employees better off”); see 
also Alain Supiot, Law and Labour: A World Market of Norms?, 39 NEW LEFT REV. 109, 120 
(May-June 2006) (arguing that the law can and should serve noneconomic human values). 
154. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, in CONVER-
GENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 33 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe 
eds., 2004). 
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Fissuring can partially but not completely insulate lead ﬁrms from the work-
ers who perform outsourced tasks and from the blowback that may hit even far-
away lead ﬁrms when those workers suffer abuse. Recall Apple’s brand-bruising 
scandals when a dozen Foxconn workers committed suicide in 2010, or when 
others were injured in explosions or suffered nerve damage from the use of dan-
gerous chemicals in the manufacture of iPhones and iPads.
155
 By contrast, robots 
and algorithms have no human rights to be violated and no bodies to be bruised 
or battered. Foxconn’s plan to automate nearly all of its operations will avert 
some risks to both Apple and Foxconn, for robots do not commit suicide or suf-
fer nerve damage. 
Robots and algorithms also do not demand higher wages, form unions, or 
go on strike, as humans sometimes do. The high wages and beneﬁts that union-
ized American blue-collar workers had fought for over many decades in part 
caused the ﬂight of much manufacturing to China. But average real wages in 
China rose by a factor of ten from 1990 to 2015.
156
 Higher wages in China have 
 
155. See Tania Branigan, Chinese Workers Link Sickness to N-Hexane and Apple iPhone Screens, 
GUARDIAN (May 7, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/07/chinese 
-workers-sickness-hexane-apple-iphone [https://perma.cc/G8SG-9BSB]; Jenny Chan, Ro-
bots, Not Humans: Official Policy in China, NEW INTERNATIONALIST (Nov. 1, 2017), 
https://newint.org/features/2017/11/01/industrial-robots-china [https://perma.cc/QBB7 
-RYAC]; Charles Duhigg & David Barboza, In China, Human Costs Are Built into an iPad, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/business/ieconomy-apples 
-ipad-and-the-human-costs-for-workers-in-china.html [https://perma.cc/B9HK-UQTW]; 
Nick Statt, iPhone Manufacturer Foxconn Plans to Replace Almost Every Human Worker with Ro-
bots, VERGE (Dec. 30, 2016, 5:07 PM EST), http://www.theverge.com/2016/12/30/14128870
/foxconn-robots-automation-apple-iphone-china-manufacturing [https://perma.cc/KH26 
-GY53]. 
156. See A Tightening Grip: Rising Chinese Wages Will Only Strengthen Asia’s Hold on Manufacturing, 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 12, 2015) [hereinafter A Tightening Grip], http://www.economist.com
/news/brieﬁng/21646180-rising-chinese-wages-will-only-strengthen-asias-hold 
-manufacturing-tightening-grip [https://perma.cc/GU6C-QKN7]. Rising wages in China 
(and elsewhere) reﬂect some profound social forces. Karl Polanyi famously argued that the 
spread of capitalist markets and the commodiﬁcation of labor have historically tended to pro-
voke a countermovement—both collective agitation and political mobilization—in pursuit of 
social protection against harsh market forces. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: 
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2d ed. 2001). The countermovement 
to socialize markets is far from inevitable, especially in authoritarian countries. Yet China’s 
unelected leaders have found it necessary to raise labor standards in response to the spread of 
labor unrest. See ELI FRIEDMAN, INSURGENCY TRAP: LABOR POLITICS IN POSTSOCIALIST 
CHINA (2014); see also CYNTHIA ESTLUND, A NEW DEAL FOR CHINA’S WORKERS? 99-122 (2017) 
(describing how higher labor standards ﬁt into a larger effort to preempt politically threaten-
ing labor conﬂict and mobilization). 
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pushed some suppliers to poorer countries with cheaper labor and have led oth-
ers to automate their Chinese factories.
157
 Some manufacturing has even re-
turned to the United States, but to factories equipped with robots and 3-D print-
ers, and staffed with a relative handful of workers who are more likely to have an 
engineering degree than just a high school diploma.
158
 
Even if workers demand only a decent living wage—as the “Fight for $15” 
movement does in many high-cost U.S. cities—they may bolster the managerial 
case for automation. Andrew Puzder, a fast-food CEO and President Trump’s 
ﬁrst nominee for Secretary of Labor, made the point in more colloquial terms: 
“If you’re making labor more expensive, and automation less expensive—this is 
not rocket science.”
159
 The ﬁrst burger-ﬂipping robots might be expensive rela-
tive to low-wage fast food workers. But as innovation races forward, the ma-
chines get cheaper and more efficient while labor usually does not. At some 
point, the up-front investment will be worthwhile, if not obligatory, for ﬁrms in 
a competitive market. 
Unlike human labor, machines tend inexorably to get more capable and 
cheaper over time.
160
 The falling costs and expanding capabilities of robots and 
algorithms stem from the mysterious but much studied dynamics of innovation. 
In response to ﬁrms’ demand for ways to lower costs and increase productivity, 
tech ﬁrms on the supply side race to improve the capabilities and lower the cost 
of the technologies that enable both ﬁssuring and automation.
161
 
In short, technological innovation outpaces human evolution. That oversim-
pliﬁes things, of course; educational and cultural institutions expand the horizon 
of human aptitudes. But the functional capabilities of machines appear to be ris-
ing much faster and with fewer apparent natural limits than those of humans. 
At the same time, humans are unable, even if they were willing, to keep pace 
with the falling cost of machines. The organizational innovations that come un-
der the rubric of ﬁssuring, though facilitated by technology, still run up against 
the upper bounds of human performance and the lower bounds of the cost of 
 
157. See A Tightening Grip, supra note 156. 
158. See Jeffrey Rothfeder, Why Donald Trump Is Wrong About Manufacturing Jobs and China, NEW 
YORKER (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why-donald 
-trump-is-wrong-about-manufacturing-jobs-and-china [https://perma.cc/AB4R-XW8W]. 
159. Kate Taylor, Fast-Food CEO Says He’s Investing in Machines Because the Government Is Making 
It Difficult to Afford Employees, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 16, 2016, 5:30 PM), https://www
.businessinsider.com/carls-jr-wants-open-automated-location-2016-3 [https://perma.cc
/HT2N-44CX]. 
160. FORD, supra note 3. 
161. See Hrdy, supra note 119 (questioning whether society necessarily beneﬁts from speeding the 
pace of labor-saving innovations, as intellectual property protections can do). 
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sustaining human beings and reproducing their labor. Automation transcends 
both. 
So automation is different from the various forms of ﬁssuring that have 
drawn so much attention from labor scholars in recent years. It offers ﬁrms the 
ultimate exit from the costs of employing human labor, including those stem-
ming from the large body of law, developed over centuries, that regulates human 
labor and the sometimes-complex relationships between the users and the sup-
pliers of labor. That is unsettling. But it reﬂects another basic difference between 
automation and ﬁssuring: automation simply obviates some of the problems 
that the law of work addresses. It reduces workers’ exposure to occupational ill-
ness or injury, discrimination, retaliation, and excessive hours. To the extent that 
technology replaces human workers in dangerous jobs, OSHA has no role to 
play, for there are no hazards to abate or regulate. So, too, with excessive work 
hours or discrimination. 
The law of work is largely concerned with ensuring decent terms and condi-
tions of work in whatever jobs exist. Indeed, it reﬂects a societal judgment about 
what jobs should and should not exist. By and large, however, it neither seeks to 
ensure that jobs do exist, nor to compel ﬁrms to use humans to do things that 
machines can do better or cheaper or both, nor to hold ﬁrms responsible for the 
humans whose labor they no longer need.
162
 Other bodies of law—environmen-
tal or consumer safety regulations, for example—might be deployed in ways that 
deliberately or incidentally slow the destruction of jobs. Concerns about traffic 
safety, whether justiﬁed or not, might thus slow down the advent of autonomous 
vehicles and the displacement of millions of U.S. workers who make their living 
by driving cars or trucks.
163
 But the U.S. law of work itself simply is not designed 
to preserve jobs or to slow the pace of job destruction in the private sector. 
To be sure, a “right to work”—a right to a job and a corresponding duty of 
government to promote full employment—has been a recurring demand from 
left-liberals since the New Deal,
164
 and it ﬁnds support in international labor law 
 
162. That is, apart from the system of temporary unemployment compensation for those who are 
actually laid off. 
163. See Why Waiting for Perfect Autonomous Vehicles May Cost Lives, RAND CORP. (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://www.rand.org/blog/articles/2017/11/why-waiting-for-perfect-autonomous 
-vehicles-may-cost-lives.html [https://perma.cc/TLQ8-NZMT]. 
164. The “right to work” touted by organized labor (as distinct from the antiunion “right-to-work” 
slogan that is more familiar in U.S. public discourse) has a long history in the United States. 
See, e.g., Senator Huey P. Long, Statement of the Share Our Wealth Movement (May 23, 1935), 
in 74 CONG. REC. 8040-43 (1935) (calling for, among other things, a national minimum in-
come and a limitation on the hours of work); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Showdown for Non-
Violence, LOOK, Apr. 16, 1968, at 23, http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document 
/showdown-nonviolence [https://perma.cc/UEE9-JTYH] (calling for an “economic bill of 




 But the right to work, even when it has come closest to 
realization, is not part of the U.S. law of work as such.
166
 Nor do U.S. workers 
have a right to consult with management over decisions about the use of labor-
saving technology, as some European workers do under works-council legisla-
tion. For example, Germany permits workers to negotiate with management 
over uses of labor-saving technology.
167
 
D. How Automation Confounds Prevailing Approaches to the Regulation of 
Work 
Even if the U.S. law of work does not concern itself with the displacement of 
jobs by automation, that does not mean it is irrelevant to that process. To what-
ever extent employment laws add to the costs of human labor (without boosting 
its productivity), they tilt ﬁrms’ calculus toward labor-saving technologies.
168
 
The effect is probably greater at the low end of the labor market, where many 
highly automatable jobs reside, and where minimum wage levels prevent ﬁrms 
from shifting the costs of legal mandates onto employees through lower wages. 
Especially at the bottom of the labor market, raising the ﬂoor on wages, beneﬁts, 
and working conditions through employer mandates strengthens the business 
case for automation of automatable jobs. 
That surely includes large increases in the minimum wage. Twenty years ago, 
Daniel Shaviro observed that “[m]ost economists of all ideological persuasions 
have long agreed that [the minimum wage] is self-defeating: it destroys jobs in 
 
rights,” which “would guarantee a job to all people who want to work and are able to work”). 
The “right to work,” or at least the effort to ensure full employment, largely supplanted the 
earlier effort to reduce working hours. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100. For more 
recent calls for a “right to work” in the form of a federal jobs guarantee, see infra text accom-
panying note 260. 
165. For an excellent collection of essays offering theoretical, comparative, and historical perspec-
tives on the “right to work,” see THE RIGHT TO WORK: LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES (Virginia Mantouvalou ed., 2015). This line of inquiry is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, though it is one that I plan to include in future work on the topic. 
166. See Katherine V.W. Stone, A Right to Work in the United States: Historical Antecedents and Con-
temporary Possibilities, in THE RIGHT TO WORK: LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, su-
pra note 165, at 275. 
167. See Walther Müller-Jentsch, Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-management, in WORKS 
COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
53, 58-60 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streek eds., 1995). 
168. The McKinsey study makes that clear. See MGI, A Future that Works, supra note 31, at 7. 
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the low-wage sector of the economy and thus hurts many of the people it is in-
tended to help.”
169
  The widely discussed Card and Krueger studies in the 
1990s,
170
 as well as more recent empirical studies, have challenged that consen-
sus.
171
  Others discount those studies and hold to the orthodox position.
172
 
While the debate continues with regard to moderate increases in the minimum 
wage, most economists would now agree that small increases do not matter 
much, and that large increases are indeed likely to lead to job losses, at least 
among the least skilled workers.
173
 At any point along either spectrum, how-
ever—from small to large increases in the minimum wage, or from orthodoxy to 
heterodoxy—the growing capabilities and falling costs of automation are bound 
to tilt the scales to some degree toward displacement of workers. 
Puzder’s comment cited above (“this is not rocket science”) makes the well-
nigh irrefutable point that the business case for automation is stronger if direct 
wage costs are ﬁfteen dollars an hour versus eight dollars an hour. Puzder was 
 
169. Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 406 (1997). 
170. See DAVID E. CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF 
THE MINIMUM WAGE (1995). For a critique of the methodology of the Card and Kruger stud-
ies, see Shaviro, supra note 169. 
171. See Arindrajit Dube et al., Minimum Wage Effects Across State Borders: Estimates Using Contig-
uous Counties (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t, IRLE Working Paper No. 157-07, 2010), 
https://irle.berkeley.edu/ﬁles/2010/Minimum-Wage-Effects-Across-State-Borders.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C4AC-53UD]. For a round-up of recent studies ﬁnding no impact of (usu-
ally modest) increases in minimum wage levels on employment, see Holly Sklar, Research 
Shows Minimum Wage Increases Do Not Cause Job Loss, BUS. FOR FAIR MINIMUM WAGE, 
https://www.businessforafairminimumwage.org/news/00135/research-shows-minimum 
-wage-increases-do-not-cause-job-loss [https://perma.cc/VJ5X-HMYE]. 
172. See David Neumark, The Effects of Minimum Wages on Employment, FED. RES. BANK S.F. (Dec. 
21, 2015), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2015 
/december/effects-of-minimum-wage-on-employment [https://perma.cc/WEP2-S3PD]. 
173. For example, liberal economist Jared Bernstein, based on recent studies including Dube et al., 
supra note 171, concludes: “I don’t think we should worry too much about the impact of mod-
erate minimum wage increases on labor substitution . . . . Large minimum wage increases, 
like going to $15 in places with low wages, are another story,” and may need to be phased in 
slowly. See Jared Bernstein, Minimum Wages and Capital/Labor Substitution, ON THE ECON.: 
JARED BERNSTEIN BLOG (Aug. 17, 2015, 3:43 PM), https://jaredbernsteinblog.com/minimum 
-wages-and-capitallabor-substitution [https://perma.cc/U7FU-GYSL]. Similarly, Alan 
Krueger (of the Card-Krueger study, supra note 170, which challenged the orthodox view of 
employment effects of minimum wage increases) argues that an increase to $12 per hour 
“would not have a meaningful negative effect on United States employment,” but that “$15 
an hour is beyond international experience, and could well be counterproductive,” especially 
in low-wage regions. Alan B. Krueger, Opinion, The Minimum Wage: How Much Is Too Much?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/opinion/sunday/the 
-minimum-wage-how-much-is-too-much.html [https://perma.cc/8TE6-272J]. 
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excoriated by workers’ advocates for preferring robots to workers.
174
 But at the 
point that robots can perform as well as or better than humans at a lower cost, 
they will be irresistible for ﬁrms in competitive markets, lest those ﬁrms lose 
proﬁts, market share, and investors. That is indeed “not rocket science”; it is 
Capitalism 101. And if new job creation lags behind job destruction, then those 
who call for signiﬁcant hikes in the minimum wage—or in any other material 
labor standards that raise employer costs—face a dilemma. 
A similar dilemma plagues the prevailing legal responses to ﬁssuring. Even 
as law-related labor costs tend to promote ﬁssuring in all its varied forms, in-
cluding the disintegration of jobs into “gigs,” ﬁssuring tends to undermine labor 
standards and the employment-based social model. Faced with this very big 
problem, labor scholars have converged on a solution with several variations: 
shore up what I call the “fortress of employment”—the whole array of rights and 
duties associated with employment—by expanding lead ﬁrms’ responsibility for 
the wages and working conditions of the workers whose labor they use.
175
 Hence 
the proliferation of scholarship and advocacy aimed at combatting misclassiﬁca-
tion of employees as independent contractors and at expanding the deﬁnition of 
“employment,” including the scope of “joint employment,” so that it is harder 
for lead ﬁrms to escape the costs of complying with labor standards. Other schol-
ars have proposed more radically reconstructing the concept of employment,
176
 
or dismantling the distinction between employees and independent contrac-
tors,
177
 or creating an intermediate category between the highly regulated em-





174. See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, Andy Puzder, Trump’s Choice for Labor Secretary, Is a Good Spokesman 
for Fast-Food Restaurant Owners. For Their Employees, Not So Much, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016, 
1:40 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-ﬁ-hiltzik-puzder-labor-20161208 
-story.html [https://perma.cc/9P7T-JQBW]. 
175. See WEIL, supra note 23. 
176. See JEREMIAS PRASSL, THE CONCEPT OF THE EMPLOYER (2015). 
177. See Judy Fudge et al., Changing Boundaries in Employment: Developing a New Platform for La-
bour Law, 10 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 329, 336 (2003). 
178. See GUY DAVIDOV, A PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO LABOUR LAW (2016); H.W. Arthurs, The De-
pendent Contractor: A Study of the Legal Problems of Countervailing Power, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 
89 (1965). A more recent proposal in the United States along these lines focuses on the status 
of “platform-based” workers such as Uber drivers. See Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A 
Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker,” 
HAMILTON PROJECT (Dec. 2015), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/ﬁles/modernizing
_labor_laws_for_twenty_ﬁrst_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/66AB 
-G82M]. 
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These proposals generally aim to expand the responsibility of ﬁrms for the 
people who supply their labor inputs. That is, they aim to extend to those ﬁrms 
some or all of the legal costs and burdens that are conventionally tied to employ-
ment, and to extend to some actually or nominally “self-employed” individuals 
the corresponding beneﬁts and protections. The effort to expand ﬁrms’ respon-
sibility for workers whom they do not formally employ is vehemently opposed 
by many in the business community, who argue that it will squelch innovation, 
ﬂexibility, and growth.
179
 But corporations do not merely oppose these efforts; 
they can often escape them by rewriting contracts and reconﬁguring supplier 
relationships to avoid employer status.
180
 Smart legal tests of “employment” aim 
to defeat that response by ignoring the formalities that are most easily manipu-
lated by ﬁrms and focusing on functional issues of control (however exercised), 
integration into the ﬁrm’s operations, or genuine entrepreneurial autonomy of 
the worker.
181
 If ﬁrms have to pay a functional price to avoid employer respon-
sibilities, more workers will remain within the fortress of employment. 
 
179. See, for example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s statements against Obama-era expan-
sions of “joint-employer” responsibility in the NLRB, Establish a Proper Deﬁnition of Joint Em-
ployer, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief 
/establish-proper-deﬁnition-joint-employer [https://perma.cc/S7QY-B3LK], and in the De-
partment of Labor (DOL), Wage and Hour’s Joint Employer Pile-on, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Feb. 
10, 2016), https://www.uschamber.com/article/wage-and-hour-s-joint-employer-pile 
[https://perma.cc/L7HJ-2UV3]. The Trump NLRB and DOL have both obliged. See Board 
Proposes Rule to Change Its Joint-Employer Standard, NLRB (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.nlrb
.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-proposes-rule-change-its-joint-employer-standard 
[https://perma.cc/AU7Z-UX98]; Secretary of Labor Withdraws Joint Employment, Independent 
Contractor Informal Guidance, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (June 7, 2017), https://www.dol.gov 
/newsroom/releases/opa/opa20170607 [https://perma.cc/DM7J-XL8N]. 
180. See DAVIDOV, supra note 178, at 116; WEIL, supra note 23, at 236-37; Independent Contractor 
Misclassiﬁcation Imposes Huge Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, NAT’L EMP. L. 
PROJECT (July 2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Independent-Contractor-Costs
.pdf [https://perma.cc/84NX-FUC6] (reviewing recent studies on the misclassiﬁcation of 
employees as independent contractors). 
181. See DAVIDOV, supra note 178, at 115; Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Em-
ployee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 
306-14 (2001). The so-called “ABC test” is one such test. As articulated recently by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court, the hiring ﬁrm has 
the burden of meeting a three-part test to escape employer status: 
(A) [T]hat the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connec-
tion with the performance of the work, both under the contract . . . and in fact; (B) 
that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s 
business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently es-
tablished trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed 
for the hiring entity. 
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The exit option of automation, however, confounds this otherwise sensible 
strategy of expanding the scope of employer responsibility. The more successful 
worker advocates are in holding lead ﬁrms responsible for the workers who sup-
ply their labor inputs, the greater those ﬁrms’ incentive to replace workers alto-
gether through automation.
182
 In other words, if McDonalds, Inc., is held to be 
the employer of its franchisees’ employees, or if Uber is deemed to be the em-
ployer of its drivers, those ﬁrms are marginally more likely to turn to burger-
ﬂipping robots or self-driving vehicles. 
An analogous dilemma shadows the evolving response to branded ﬁrms’ off-
shoring of operations to lower-cost, less-regulated jurisdictions. Echoing the do-
mestic strategy of expanding the scope of employer responsibility, advocates and 
scholars have sought over the course of several decades to develop transnational 
regulatory tools—some of them “soft law,” others with harder edges—that aim 
to hold major corporations responsible for labor conditions within their supply 
chains.
183
 Progress has been halting, and ﬁrms’ public commitments to social 
responsibility surely outstrip actual improvements on the ground.
184
 Still, we are 
very far from the days when big consumer brands could respond to reports of 
forced labor or child labor in their supply chains by claiming they were “just the 
buyer.”
185
 That is seen, for example, in Apple’s response to a rash of negative 
publicity about injuries to the Foxconn workers who assemble iPhones and iPads 
 
416 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2018). Commentators have pointed out that Uber and many other “gig 
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183. See Alan Hyde, To What Duties Do Global Labour Rights Correlate?: Responsibility for Labour 
Standards down the Production Chain, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR RIGHTS 
209, 209-236 (Yossi Dahan et al. eds., 2016); see also Cynthia Estlund, Enforcement of Private 
Transnational Labor Regulation: A New Frontier in the Anti-Sweatshop Movement?, in ENFORCE-
MENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBAL WORLD 237 
(Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2012). 
184. See Estlund, supra note 183, at 241-47. 
185. See id. at 241 (recounting that, when early antisweatshop activists sought to hold Nike ac-
countable for labor violations in its supply chain, Nike claimed to be “just the buyer”). 




 Apple felt compelled to improve transparency and monitoring and 
to put resources into improving labor conditions at Foxconn.
187
 
Automation modestly complicates this transnational strategy. The more suc-
cessful global labor regulators and advocates are in holding branded ﬁrms polit-
ically, socially, or even legally responsible for labor conditions in their global sup-
ply chains, the more those ﬁrms and their suppliers have an incentive to switch 
to robots. For Apple, one side beneﬁt of Foxconn’s ambitious plan to replace 
most of its Chinese workers with robots—starting with the most dangerous 
jobs—is that it will neatly sidestep future scandals based on labor abuses. 
None of this means that advocates and scholars are misguided in seeking to 
hold proﬁtable and capable ﬁrms accountable for the wages and working condi-
tions of the workers, foreign and domestic, who supply necessary labor inputs. 
Still, proponents of this sensible multifaceted response to ﬁssuring should 
reckon with the fact that it not only fails to meet the potential challenge of auto-
mation-based job loss, but also tends to tilt ﬁrms’ calculus further away from 
human labor and toward machines. It might even contribute to what Dani Rod-
rik calls “premature deindustrialization,” by which developing countries experi-
ence declining employment in industry before attaining the income, resources, 
and infrastructure needed to advance to a postindustrial economy.
188
 
At the same time, the Apple-Foxconn case illustrates again the double-edged 
nature of automation for workers. Automation is enabling Foxconn to eliminate 
some very dangerous jobs, as well as hundreds of thousands of other jobs whose 
grueling nature was blamed for a spate of worker suicides in 2010.
189
 If the dis-
placed workers end up with better jobs, this case may show innovation and cre-
ative destruction at their most virtuous. If not, it may illustrate the double-edged 
nature of efforts to hold lead ﬁrms responsible for upstream working conditions, 
at least for workers who lack decent alternatives. That does not mean we should 
 
186. See Duhigg & Barboza, supra note 155. 
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188. See Dani Rodrik, Premature Deindustrialization, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 20935, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20935 [https://perma.cc/EY8Y 
-GEYD]. Rodrik notes that a signiﬁcant factor in “premature deindustrialization” is the ero-
sion of labor-cost-based comparative advantages in manufacturing by automation. Id. 
189. See David Barboza, After Suicides, Scrutiny of China’s Grim Factories, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2010), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/business/global/07suicide.html [https://perma.cc
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abandon those efforts, but we should proceed with eyes wide open, and on the 
lookout for ways to mitigate the dilemma they pose. 
i i i .  a way forward in the face of uncertainty 
Workers, their organizations, and their advocates have long struggled to 
raise labor standards, expand employee rights and beneﬁts, and improve the en-
forcement of these legal entitlements. For present purposes, we may assume that 
those labor standards, rights, and beneﬁts serve the interests of workers and the 
society as a whole; they represent an evolving societal conception of “decent 
work.” But to private ﬁrms, many of those entitlements entail net labor costs or 
risks that are worth avoiding if possible—in effect, they tax the employment of 
human labor. Fissuring strategies enable ﬁrms to avoid or evade some of those 
costs, and legal efforts to expand the scope of direct or joint employer responsi-
bility aim to make that more difficult. Automation sidesteps those efforts and 
more completely avoids the costs of human labor, including those stemming 
from the law. The automation option becomes ever more compelling as the cost 
of machines falls and their capabilities rise. 
All in all, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that labor costs stemming from 
employment laws are among the factors that lead ﬁrms to automate jobs and 
replace people. Those costs accelerate what might be an already-inevitable de-
cline in the overall demand for human labor, especially in midlevel jobs. That is 
a serious concern if, as I have argued, a faster process of automation will make it 
much harder for individuals, institutions, and society as a whole to respond in 
ways that mitigate the losses and spread the gains from automation. Such a con-
clusion might point to a verdict that would be dispiriting to worker advocates 
and many labor and employment law scholars: perhaps we should now be look-
ing for judicious ways to unburden or deregulate the employment relationship 
so as to slow down, or avoid speeding up, automation-related job losses. 
There are reasons to resist this “unburdening” strategy, even apart from the 
basic uncertainty about the future net impact of automation on employment, 
and I will turn to them below. But ﬁrst, we must return to that basic empirical 
uncertainty, for it has important implications for the strategy going forward, and 
for whether and in what ways to “unburden” employment. This Part will frame 
the objectives of an optimal strategy, illustrate how the strategy would work in 
several contexts, and defend it against some objections. 
A. Framing a Strategy in the Face of Uncertainty 
As discussed in Part I, the prospect that automation will produce sizable net 
job losses and growing wage disparities in the next decade or two is uncertain 
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and hotly debated, including among economists who are chieﬂy concerned with 
the well-being of ordinary workers. There is disagreement as well over whether 
a net decline in the demand for labor might be a boon for most people (if we had 
the political will and capacity to fairly distribute leisure, income, and the work 
that remains). There is much less controversy, however, over three related prob-
lems: growing economic inequality, erosion of labor standards at the bottom of the 
labor market, and the role of ﬁssuring in both trends. That is, there is wider 
agreement that those three trends exist and that they are detrimental to workers 
and society.
190
 I do not intend to argue those points further—for example, to 
rehearse arguments that our economy is too unequal—but will take them as rea-
sonable premises for the argument that follows. 
Given the relatively wide consensus about inequality, erosion of labor stand-
ards, and ﬁssuring, one might conclude that we should put a priority on address-
ing those problems rather than the more uncertain prospect of automation-re-
lated job losses. Unfortunately, as shown in Part II, the prevailing responses 
within labor and employment law to the former set of problems—that is, raising 
minimum labor standards and mandatory beneﬁts and expanding the reach of 
employer responsibility for compliance—tend to accelerate the loss of jobs to au-
tomation. 
Can we avoid the opposite problem in framing a response to the threat of 
automation? That is, can we slow the tide of job destruction while also address-
ing the problems of ﬁssuring, inequality, and deteriorating labor standards? 
Without pretending to magically dissolve the dilemmas ﬂagged above, I believe 
we can devise a strategy that will make progress on all these fronts. It is possible, 
in short, to reduce the legal tax on employment—and thus marginally reduce 
ﬁrms’ incentive both to replace human workers with machines and to replace 
employees with contractors—while improving the quality of work and of life for 
most workers. 
It seems axiomatic that reducing the legal tax on employment, and thus re-
ducing the cost of labor, will tend to reduce ﬁrms’ incentive to outsource labor 
 
190. For example, the left-leaning Economic Policy Institute, which rejects the claim that automa-
tion has hurt workers’ employment or wages, see Mishel & Bivens, supra note 20, has reported 
critically on problems of wage stagnation and growing inequality, see Josh Bivens, Inequality 
Is Slowing U.S. Economic Growth, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.epi.org
/ﬁles/pdf/136654.pdf [https://perma.cc/PD59-H4KW], and on ﬁrms’ growing use of often-
misclassiﬁed independent contractors in place of employees, see Françoise Carré, (In)depend-
ent Contractor Misclassiﬁcation, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June 8, 2015), https://www.epi.org/ﬁles
/pdf/87595.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL4Q-LKS2]. 
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needs and to automate them.
191
 The challenge is to do that while maintaining or 
improving labor standards and mitigating inequality. The ﬁrst step in meeting 
that challenge lies in separating the normative question of which entitlements 
workers should have from the question of where the attendant costs should fall, 
or how the entitlements should be ﬁnanced. (I use the term “entitlements” here, 
despite its political baggage, to encompass all of the rights, protections, beneﬁts, 
and minimum labor standards to which workers are entitled by law.) The latter 
question, I will argue, is more practical than normative. In some cases it makes 
sense to put the costs of workers’ entitlements on those who employ workers, or 
more broadly on those who use their labor. But in other cases, it does not. Having 
identiﬁed the appropriate set of worker entitlements, we need to conduct an in-
ventory to determine which of those entitlements should correspond to em-
ployer burdens and which should not. 
Separating the question of what workers’ entitlements should be from the 
question of how they should be paid for opens up constructive possibilities on 
three fronts. It allows us to reduce the labor-and-employment-law tax on the use 
of human labor; to extend some rights and beneﬁts to nonemployed workers; 
and, not just incidentally, to redistribute some of the enormous wealth that is 
ﬂowing to the already wealthy, especially to those who own or make the ma-
chines. 
B. Employee Entitlements that Are Inextricable from Employer Mandates 
Some of the hard-won rights and protections of workers necessarily entail 
duties and burdens on those who employ them. That is true, for example, of 
laws regulating workplace hazards. Employers exercise actual or potential con-
trol over many aspects of workplace safety. Compelling them to abate hazards 
and to internalize the costs of occupational injuries and disease gives them an 
incentive to exercise their control to avoid those losses. The point holds as well 
for laws prohibiting discrimination and retaliation (against whistleblowers, for 
example). These laws are designed to redress past harms and to prevent future 
harms; and the latter requires altering employer behavior. Forcing the ﬁrm to 
answer for past harms deters future misconduct and encourages organizational 
precautions that reduce the individual and social harms of discrimination and 
retaliation. 
 
191. Indeed, to the degree that law effectively taxes the employment of human labor (as opposed 
to being borne wholly by employees in the form of a lower cash wage, see supra notes 147-148 
and accompanying text), it distorts ﬁrms’ demand for labor versus capital in the form of labor-
saving technology. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 119, at 27. Reducing that tax 
would thus improve economic efficiency as well as slow the loss of jobs to automation. 
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The point is not that these laws impose no costs or trade-offs on employers. 
If compliance entails a net cost to employers that they cannot pass on to workers 
through lower wages, those employers are presumably more likely to replace 
workers with machines. That trade-off should be considered by advocates and 
policy makers in deciding whether and how to regulate labor standards. Yet 
some trade-offs between the number of jobs and their quality are obviously jus-
tiﬁed. Once we as a society conclude that a decent job entails protection from 
hazardous conditions and from discrimination and retaliation, there is no way 
around imposing the costs of those protections on employers (perhaps to be 
shared, as market conditions permit, with employees and consumers). 
The same is true of laws that regulate working time. One typical feature of 
the employment relationship is employer control over work hours and schedul-
ing. American legislatures have been regulating working time for well over a cen-
tury, albeit in the teeth of judicial resistance until the New Deal breakthrough.
192
 
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 established a forty-hour workweek 
and a time-and-a-half overtime premium for most employees.
193
 More recently, 
worker advocates have pushed for “fair scheduling” laws in response to employ-
ers’ high-tech efforts to reduce staffing costs by tailoring work schedules to cus-
tomer volume.
194
 Laws that regulate onerous “just-in-time” scheduling practices 
presumably increase the costs of employing people in some jobs to some de-
gree—relative, that is, to a baseline of unfettered employer discretion—and affect 
ﬁrms’ calculus as to whether to automate those jobs. But if the entitlement to 
“fair scheduling” is justiﬁed (as I think it is), then so is the regulation of employ-
ers’ scheduling practices. There is no way to regulate hours and scheduling, and 
to protect workers’ ability to plan and live their lives, without regulating em-
ployers and imposing costs on them. 
For the subset of worker entitlements that necessarily or practically entail 
employer duties and burdens, the scope of employer responsibility should be 
broad enough to protect the underlying rights and entitlements, to promote 
compliance, and to discourage evasion through ﬁssuring. The law should aim to 
minimize lead ﬁrms’ ability to evade responsibility by misclassifying workers as 
independent contractors, or to avoid the cost of compliance by contracting out 
the work. That weighs in favor of extending some of these entitlements to inde-
 
192. See Frank T. deVyver, Regulation of Wages and Hours Prior to 1938, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
323, 325-26 (1939). 
193. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 7, 52 Stat. 1060, 1063 (codiﬁed as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2018)). 
194. See Jonathan Timm, Why Fair Scheduling Could Be Labor’s Next Big Fight, THESE TIMES (Nov. 
25, 2016), http://inthesetimes.com/article/19669/why-fair-scheduling-could-be-labors 
-next-big-ﬁght [https://perma.cc/6VFV-XHJ6]. 
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pendent contractors—for example, protections against discrimination and retal-
iation, and against hazards within the control of the contracting ﬁrm. It also 
weighs in favor of “joint employer” responsibility on the part of lead ﬁrms, at 
least for contractor violations that the lead ﬁrm knows or should know about. 
Such liability should induce lead ﬁrms to monitor and control errant contractors. 
In other words, for this subset of worker rights and entitlements, efforts to ex-
tend the reach of lead ﬁrms’ responsibility for workers in their supply chain—to 
shore up the “fortress of employment”—make eminent good sense. 
Again, I assume that efforts to abate occupational hazards, prevent discrimi-
nation and retaliation, and regulate working hours—and to expand coverage and 
responsibility for compliance with those laws—do generally raise the cost of hu-
man labor relative to machines. Those entitlements, though, are part of our so-
ciety’s evolving deﬁnition of “decent work,” and they necessarily entail corre-
sponding duties and burdens on employers. Debates over the establishment and 
enforcement of minimum labor standards and nonwaivable worker rights have 
always been about what jobs we think are worth having at all at any point in our 
economic and social development. The growing capabilities of machines might, 
and perhaps should, draw closer attention to that trade-off. But once we settle 
on what “decent work” entails, and on the corresponding need to change em-
ployer behavior by imposing certain costs and liabilities on them, we should 
strive to make that judgment stick as broadly as possible, knowing and even in-
tending that some jobs will be lost. 
C. Employee Entitlements that Can and Should Be Detached from Employer 
Mandates 
That prescription does not apply, however, to all entitlements that are or 
could be attached to employment. Some employer mandates redress no harms 
that are caused or preventable by the employer. While these mandates may sup-
port crucial social entitlements, charging their cost to the employer is not neces-
sary to protect those entitlements. On the contrary, they function as taxes on the 
employment of human labor, and introduce a distortion in ﬁrms’ demand for 




195. Brishen Rogers similarly notes that the cost of “employment-linked beneﬁts” is “part of the 
reason ﬁrms seek to avoid employing their workers,” versus treating them as independent 
contractors. Rogers, supra note 25, at 517. For that reason, he suggests that “employment-re-
lated duties should be limited to those that advance goals that can only be achieved through 
changes to employer policies.” Id. at 518. Rogers calls for the “socialization” of beneﬁts and 
their funding, citing the mitigation of economic inequality and greater worker mobility. Id. 
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Take health insurance, for example—a big-ticket item for many U.S. employ-
ers.
196
 Let us posit that employees need access to affordable health care, and that 
most of them need help paying for it. But should the cost fall on their employers? 
In general, employers bear no causal responsibility for the health-care needs of 
workers or their families; and there is no deterrent logic in requiring employers 
to bear a portion of employees’ health insurance costs, as the pay-or-play man-
date of the ACA tends to do. On the contrary, the ACA might counterproduc-
tively deter some employment, for employers can escape its reach by reducing 
employees’ hours below thirty per week, the threshold for employee coverage, 
or by keeping the size of their workforce below ﬁfty, the threshold for employer 
coverage.
197
 An employer mandate, to the extent it imposes signiﬁcant and una-
voidable costs on employers, will tend to discourage some employment and en-
courage the replacement of employees with machines, or with contractors who 
are not covered by the mandate, where either is feasible. 
There are proposals afoot to extend guaranteed health (and other) beneﬁts 
to all workers, including part-time employees and independent contractors or 
“gig” workers, while maintaining the link to paid work. Ideally those beneﬁts 
would be portable from job to job and funded on a pro rata basis by ﬁrms on 
behalf of all who perform work for them.
198
 The result would be to afford cov-
erage to individuals who need it, and to reduce ﬁrms’ incentive to substitute 
 
These proposals are sketched brieﬂy at the end of an article on classiﬁcation of platform work-
ers. But the congruence of our proposals suggests an important point: there are a number of 
good reasons to socialize many “employment-linked beneﬁts”; the goal of slowing automa-
tion-related job losses is one more good reason to do so. 
196. According to a 2016 survey of employers, “[a]nnual premiums for employer-sponsored family 
health coverage reached $18,142 this year, up 3% from last year, with workers on average pay-
ing $5,277 towards the cost of their coverage.” 2016 Employer Health Beneﬁts Survey: Abstract, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2016 
-employer-health-beneﬁts-survey [https://perma.cc/NH78-B995]. Not all of these costs are 
the product of legal mandates, of course. 
197. See Alexander, supra note 143, at 318. The empirical evidence on these effects is mixed. One 
study estimated “an increase in low-hours, involuntary part-time employment of a half-mil-
lion to a million workers in retail, accommodations, and food services.” Marcus Dillender et 
al., Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Part-Time Employment: Early Evidence (Upjohn Inst., 
Working Paper No. 16-258, 2016), https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1276&context=up_workingpapers [https://perma.cc/KK8V-TGVB]. Other studies are in-
conclusive or show limited effects. See, e.g., Abraham & Royalty, supra note 146, at 21-22; see 
also id. at 11 (summarizing related work). 
198. One proposal along these lines—though not clearly framed as mandatory—has gained sup-
port from a wide range of stakeholders. See Byron Auguste et al., Common Ground for Independent 
Workers: Principles for Delivering a Stable and Flexible Safety Net for All Types of Work, WTF? ECONOMY 
(Nov. 9, 2015), https://wtfeconomy.com/common-ground-for-independent-workers 
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part-timers or freelancers for full-time employees. That is all to the good. But as 
long as the mandate is tied to the use of human labor, it will still tend to tilt the 
users’ calculus toward the exit option of automation (or perhaps the other exit 
option of transnational outsourcing) when that is feasible. 
The point here is simple, though the details are devilish. Although a broad 
entitlement to health insurance makes good sense, that does not necessarily dic-
tate putting its cost on the users of labor. Uncoupling the funding of health ben-
eﬁts from the use of human labor will mitigate ﬁrms’ incentive to replace em-
ployees with contractors and human labor with machines. I will return brieﬂy 
below to the question of how to ﬁnance beneﬁts such as health insurance if not 
through an employer mandate. For now I will simply note that most alternative 
ﬁnance mechanisms have the added virtue of enabling a modicum of redistribu-
tion, thus mitigating economic inequality. 
Rather than only repealing the ACA’s employer mandate, we should replace 
it with something better. Repeal-and-replace, if you like. The United States is an 
outlier among developed countries in its failure to ensure universal health-care 
coverage.
199
 It long relied on voluntary employer provision of health beneﬁts 
(with the increasingly weak spur of collective bargaining and competition with 
unionized ﬁrms), and a backstop of Medicaid for the poor and Medicare for the 
elderly. The ACA took an important step forward by imposing an employer 
mandate (plus a now-deceased individual mandate to cover those still left out in 
the cold).
200
 A broader mandate that covered some independent workers would 
be a further improvement. But the tax that such employer mandates impose on 
 
-83f3fbcf548f [https://perma.cc/JLL5-TSFT] (“Everyone, regardless of employment classifi-
cation, should have access to the option of an affordable safety net that supports them when 
they’re injured, sick, in need of professional growth, or when it’s time to retire.”). 
199. Among countries in the OECD, the United States has by far the lowest level of public health-
care coverage (under 35% compared to 100% coverage in most countries); including private 
health-care coverage, the United States is still next-to-last among OECD countries (ahead of 
Greece) in health-care coverage, and is one of the few that has not achieved universal health 
coverage. Universal Health Coverage and Health Outcomes, OECD 9 (2016), https://www.oecd
.org/els/health-systems/Universal-Health-Coverage-and-Health-Outcomes-OECD-G7 
-Health-Ministerial-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AUY-7F2J; see also Special Report, America 
Is a Health-Care Outlier in the Developed World, ECONOMIST (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www 
.economist.com/special-report/2018/04/26/america-is-a-health-care-outlier-in-the 
-developed-world [https://perma.cc/8FTT-LFPS]. 
200. The ACA took a step closer to the so-called “Bismarck Model,” found in Germany, France, 
and Japan, among other developed countries. The Bismarck Model relies on private insurers 
and mostly private providers, with funding through mandatory employer contributions; it 
taxes employment, but the tax is smaller than in the United States because insurers are non-
proﬁt and tightly regulated, and costs are lower. See T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A 
GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER, CHEAPER, AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE 17 (2009). 
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the use of human labor becomes more troubling as automation becomes an in-
creasingly viable alternative. That is among the reasons to take the next step from 
an employment-based system toward some form of universal single-payer 
health-care model.
201
 Beyond that point, the extremely complex mechanics, eco-
nomics, and politics of health care are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Consider another example: paid leave for family responsibilities such as child 
care and elder care. Employees should be able to take a reasonable period of time 
off for these essential human activities without losing either their job or their 
income (as they can in every other OECD country).
202
 The beneﬁts would ﬂow 
to employees’ family members as well as employees themselves, and would tend 
to advance gender equity by mitigating the disproportionate burden of family 
responsibilities that is still borne by women.
203
 Yet who should bear the cost of 
an entitlement to family leave? 
Let us ﬁrst distinguish between the entitlement to take time off without job 
loss and the entitlement to be paid during that time. It clearly makes sense to 
require the employer to grant leave and to restore the employee’s job afterward 
(as the Family and Medical Leave Act does).
204
 Only the employer can do that, 





201. Single-payer plans may use a single government provider (as in the United Kingdom’s “Bev-
eridge Model”), or may use multiple and mostly private providers (as in Canada’s National 
Health Insurance system). See REID, supra note 200, at 17-19. The single-payer concept is still 
a political long shot in the United States, though support is growing. See, e.g., Alexander 
Burns & Jennifer Medina, The Single-Payer Party? Democrats Shift Left on Health Care, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/us/democrats-universal 
-health-care-single-payer-party.html [https://perma.cc/864W-HV7N]. 
202. Gretchen Livingston, Among 41 Nations, U.S. Is the Outlier When It Comes to Paid Parental 
Leave, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/26
/u-s-lacks-mandated-paid-parental-leave [https://perma.cc/P5RA-XWB4]. 
203. See AEI-Brookings Working Grp. on Paid Family Leave, Paid Family and Medical Leave: An 
Issue Whose Time Has Come, BROOKINGS 4-7 (May 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp 
-content/uploads/2017/06/es_20170606_paidfamilyleave.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMC6 
-B5NJ]. 
204. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2018). 
205. See FMLA and Its Impact on Organizations: A Survey Report by the Society for Human Resource 
Management, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. 26 ﬁg.12 (July 2007), https://www.shrm.org/hr 
-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/documents/fmla%20and%20its
%20impact%20on%20organizations%20survey%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYG7 
-6MME]; Jacob Alex Klerman et al., Family and Medical Leave in 2012: Technical Report, ABT 
ASSOCS., INC. 157 exhibits 8.5.1 & 8.5.2 (Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation
/fmla/FMLA-2012-Technical-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN4A-F939]. 
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What about the larger cost of paid family leave? The employer did not cause 
the circumstances giving rise to the leave and can do nothing to avoid it—or 
nothing good, anyway. If employers had to pay the cost of family leave directly 
out of current revenues, some would predictably discourage or penalize leave 
taking or discriminate against likely leave-takers, such as women of childbearing 
age.
206
 To avoid this problem, state-level paid-leave mandates in the United 
States generally use a payroll tax, which spreads the cost of paid leave across the 
entire workforce.
207
 Unfortunately, a payroll tax modestly raises the cost of em-
ploying anyone and to that degree may tilt ﬁrms’ calculus toward automating 
work where that is feasible.
208
 
Once again, we should recall the economists’ assumption that employees 
largely bear payroll taxes (in the form of lower wages) regardless of who nomi-
nally pays them.
209
 On that assumption, the resulting tax is regressive—because 
it generally phases out at higher income levels
210
—but it is not one that should 
spur automation. On the other hand, that assumption may not match the beliefs 
of employers who make decisions about hiring versus automation; and in any 
event it runs out at the low end of the labor market. To whatever extent the bur-
 
206. Of course, that would be illegal, but it might not be detectable, provable, or likely to trigger a 
lawsuit. See Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating 
the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2172-89 (1994). 
207. That is the case in California and New Jersey, two states with paid family-leave programs. A 
Trump Administration proposal would link funding to unemployment compensation pro-
grams, also funded by payroll taxes. See Maggie Haberman, Ivanka Trump Swayed the President 
on Family Leave. Congress Is a Tougher Sell, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/05/21/us/politics/ivanka-trump-parental-leave-plan.html [https://perma.cc
/8GVS-GJZB]. 
208. Paid family leave might pay off for employers in the form of employee retention and loyalty. 
That is presumably why some employers voluntarily offer paid family-leave beneﬁts. For 
those who do not, and who would be affected by a mandate, it is possible but hardly certain 
that the beneﬁts of employee retention outweigh the costs of paid leave. 
209. See Kelly Bedard & Maya Rossin-Slater, The Economic and Social Impacts of Paid Family Leave 
in California: Report for the California Employment Development Department, CAL. EMP’T DEV. 
DEP’T (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.edd.ca.gov/Disability/pdf/PFL_Economic_and_Social
_Impact_Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/MU6V-D3AP]. 
210. Payroll taxes in general are the most regressive large category of taxes (in Europe as well as in 
the United States). See Brieﬁng Book, TAX POL’Y CTR. 61 ﬁg.2 (2016), https://www 
.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/ﬁles/brieﬁng-book/tpc-brieﬁng-book_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UK4U-PBDX]; John H. Cochrane, Europe’s Payroll Taxes, GRUMPY ECONOMIST 
(Sept. 22, 2012, 3:28 PM), https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2012/09/europes-payroll 
-taxes.html [https://perma.cc/36RE-REC3]; Policy Basics: Federal Payroll Taxes, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax
/policy-basics-federal-payroll-taxes [https://perma.cc/5L9U-HTJ8]. 
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den of mandatory paid family leave does fall on employers, it is part of a cumu-




To be sure, much turns on the particulars of the program. Existing paid fam-
ily-leave mandates (in California, New Jersey, and Rhode Island, for example) 
are modest, providing for four to six weeks of partial salary replacement, up to a 
rather low cap.
212




Suppose, however, that we aspired to a more generous paid family-leave 
mandate (like those in much of Europe.)
214
 And suppose that we sought to ex-
tend the entitlement to cover a larger set of family and medical exigencies, and 
even to allow an annual paid vacation of at least three or four weeks, along with 
some number of paid holidays. If we did all those things, we would join the 
overwhelming majority of the world’s developed countries in the worthy effort 
to enable employees to care for themselves and their families and to have annual 
and periodic respites from work, without losing their income for those peri-
ods.
215
 Yet this larger entitlement to paid leave—if it were funded through a pay-
roll tax or other mandatory employer contribution keyed to number of employ-
ees and hours of work—would impose a signiﬁcant tax on employment. Far from 
inducing employers to avoid socially harmful conduct (as in the case of work-
place safety mandates and their costs), a generous paid-leave mandate would 
give ﬁrms an added incentive to offload employees and turn to ﬁssuring or au-
tomation. 
 




213. Id.; see Eileen Appelbaum & Ruth Milkman, Paid Family Leave Pays Off in California, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Jan. 19, 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/01/paid-family-leave-pays-off-in [https://
perma.cc/KNU3-T945]; The Economics of Paid and Unpaid Leave, COUNCIL ECON. ADVISERS 
19-20 (June 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/docs/leave 
_report_ﬁnal.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RVB-GRWP]. 
214. See Erin Killian, Parental Leave: The Swedes Are the Most Generous, NPR (Aug. 8, 2011 3:59 PM 
EST), https://www.npr.org/sections/babyproject/2011/08/09/139121410/parental-leave-the
-swedes-are-the-most-generous [https://perma.cc/8J87-LRRD]. 
215. The United States is the only OECD country that has no mandatory paid vacation or personal 
leave and among the few without a right to paid holidays. See Rebecca Ray & John Schmitt, 
No-Vacation Nation USA—A Comparison of Leave and Holiday in OECD Countries, EUR. TRADE 
UNION INST. 1 (2007), https://www.etui.org/content/download/3061/35676/ﬁle/EEEPB
+03+2007+BBA.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VC7-5FCC]. 
what should we do after work? 
311 
An alternative would be to shift all or part of the cost of these social beneﬁts 
onto a different—and potentially more progressive—tax base. The main goal 
would be to reduce the tax on the use of human labor for all the reasons explored 
above. But an important secondary goal could be to permit a modicum of redis-
tribution from wealthier taxpayers toward ordinary workers. I return brieﬂy be-
low to the question of how that might best be accomplished. The central point 
here is that some entitlements that have historically been linked to employment 
should be reconceived, and their funding mechanisms reconﬁgured, so that they 
do not tax and discourage the employment of human labor. Some employer 
mandates usefully force employers to bear the costs of, and thus to avoid, socially 
harmful conduct within their operations. Others, though, are politically expedi-
ent off-budget ways to ﬁnance social entitlements that bear no necessary relation 
to employment or to work.
216
 
For historically contingent reasons, both public policy and private ordering 
have held major employers in the United States—more than their counterparts 
in Europe—heavily responsible for their employees’ ability to care for their de-
pendents and to live a decent life through retirement.
217
 That model might have 
been sustainable in the economy of the past century, dominated as it was by ver-
tically integrated ﬁrms with strong internal labor markets and long-term em-
ployment relationships within mostly national labor and product markets.
218
 
But in an age of rampant ﬁssuring, shorter job tenure, proliferating contingent 
work arrangements, and global production networks, we need to rethink that 
paradigm.
219
 Rapidly advancing automation capabilities amplify the point. We 
need better ways of delivering basic social entitlements and meeting people’s 
material needs that are not dependent on steady full-time employment, and that 
do not function as a tax on the use of human labor versus machines. 
 
216. It is possible that the political advantages of existing funding mechanisms outweigh the dis-
advantages discussed here, and that the status quo is the only politically realistic alternative to 
sacriﬁcing these entitlements altogether. That is a challenge that I plan to take up in future 
work, but that I bracket here. 
217. See Stone, supra note 104, at 454-60. Collective bargaining between unions and major em-
ployers, war-time wage controls in the 1940s, and tax laws all played pivotal roles in the 
“Treaty of Detroit,” which created this template. See Shayna Strom & Mark Schmitt, Protecting 
Workers in a Patchwork Economy, CENTURY FOUND. 2 (Apr. 7, 2016), https://s3-us-west-2 
.amazonaws.com/production.tcf.org/app/uploads/2016/04/25195440/ProtectingWorkers 
InAPatchworkEconomy-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S4U-FT9W]. For more on the Treaty of 
Detroit, see NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, WALTER REUTHER: THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN DE-
TROIT (1995).
 
218. See Stone, supra note 104, at 460; Strom & Schmitt, supra note 217, at 2-3. 
219. Katherine Stone and others have made this argument for several years. See Stone, supra note 
104, at 464. 
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As suggested above, it is not just the cost of entitlements but the entitlements 
themselves that in some cases should extend beyond employment.
220
 After all, 
not only employees but also self-employed individuals need to be able to take 
time off from work without losing their entire income for the duration.
221
 That 
might be ensured through a system of what Alain Supiot refers to as “social-
drawing rights” to support time off from paid work—whether in employment 
or self-employment—for education, retraining, a job search, or volunteer civic 
work.
222
 Those “social-drawing rights” might be funded in part through forced 
savings by individual workers; but to the extent that such rights generate 
broader social beneﬁts, they could be subsidized by public revenues drawn from 
a broader and more progressive tax base. 
Subsidizing time out of the paid workforce for both employees and inde-
pendent workers would have many beneﬁts. Especially in case of future job 
losses and further declines in labor-force participation, enabling individuals to 
take time off work would have a modest but valuable tendency to spread work 
among more workers. In addition, it would serve the various human and social 
needs that require time away from work, such as caring for infants and elders, 
and it would enable individuals to upgrade their skills or switch occupations in 
a changing labor market. Finally, funding such subsidies through a broad-based 
and progressive tax would also redistribute income from the winners to the rest 
in a more polarized economy. It would do all those things without taxing, and 
thus discouraging, the use of human labor. 
The basic strategy of separating the question of what workers should be en-
titled to from the question of how to pay for those entitlements has surprising 
implications for minimum wage laws. Suppose we agree, as to the ﬁrst question, 
that all workers deserve at least a living wage—enough for a single individual 
working full-time to meet basic material needs.
223
 The current national mini-
mum wage of $7.25 per hour falls far short of a living wage not only in high-cost 
 
220. See Nicolas Colin & Bruno Palier, The Next Safety Net: Social Policy for a Digital Age, FOREIGN 
AFF. (July-Aug. 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-06-16/next-safety-net 
[https://perma.cc/3DWT-62JA]. 
221. See Julie Kashen, The Future of Work? Paid Leave for All, CENTURY FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/future-work-paid-leave [https://perma.cc/6N83 
-J6P9] (referring to New York’s recent paid family-leave law, N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW 
§ 212(4)(b) (Consol. 2018), which permits independent contractors and self-employed indi-
viduals to opt in). 
222. See ALAIN SUPIOT, BEYOND EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR 
LAW IN EUROPE 56 (2001). 
223. In other words, minimum wage workers who support one or more dependents will have to 
turn to other forms of social support. 
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states and cities (many of which have enacted higher minimum wage rates), but 
even in the poorest counties in the nation.
224
 Raising the minimum wage to a 
living wage would thus require large locally targeted increases in much of the 
country—as much as 75% in some cases.
225
 Alternatively, a large increase in the 
national minimum wage (to $15 per hour, for example) would ensure a living 
wage to most workers; but in many poorer localities it would more than double 
the prevailing minimum wage, and would far exceed a locally adjusted living 
wage.
226
 Either way, ensuring that all U.S. workers make at least a living wage—
which I take to be a self-evidently worthy aim—would require some very large 
wage increases for the poorest workers. 
The problem, as economists across the political spectrum agree, is that wage 
hikes of that magnitude are very likely to destroy jobs and displace workers.
227
 
Those wage-destructive tendencies are magniﬁed as robots and algorithms be-
come ever-better and cheaper substitutes for human workers, especially in the 
routine tasks that dominate many low-wage jobs. Workers clearly need a raise, 
but they also need jobs (at least under current social arrangements). So even if 
we agree that low-income workers need and deserve higher incomes, we should 
ask whether it makes sense to require employers to supply those higher incomes 
in the form of a much higher minimum wage. Or are there other ways to put 
some of that money into workers’ pockets? 
Indeed there are. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) currently subsidizes 
low-income workers and funds that subsidy through general revenues in the 
form of a tax expenditure. Daniel Shaviro, among others, has argued that the 
EITC is a better way to raise poor workers’ incomes and to increase the returns 
to work than higher minimum wages, both because the subsidy is better targeted 
 
224. For example, in Holmes County, Mississippi, one of the poorest counties in the country, the 
living wage is calculated to be $10.25 per hour. See Living Wage Calculation for Holmes County, 
Mississippi, LIVING WAGE CALCULATOR (2018), http://livingwage.mit.edu/counties/28051 
[https://perma.cc/M3EV-VTQU]. 
225. This would apply to Atlanta, Georgia, for example. See Living Wage Calculation for Atlanta-
Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA, LIVING WAGE CALCULATOR (2018), http://livingwage.mit.edu
/metros/12060 [https://perma.cc/KJ7F-Y2BD]. 
226. That is, it would double the minimum wage in all states and cities where the national mini-
mum wage currently prevails, and would exceed a living wage for a single individual almost 
everywhere—though not, for example, in Manhattan. See Living Wage Calculation for New York 
County, NY, LIVING WAGE CALCULATOR (2018), http://livingwage.mit.edu/counties/36061 
[https://perma.cc/GUH7-2X5M]. 
227. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text. Of course, that effect would be mitigated to 
the extent that the higher wage is introduced gradually, as some advocates propose. See Why 
America Needs a $15 Minimum Wage, ECON. POL’Y INST. & NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Apr. 26, 
2017), https://www.epi.org/ﬁles/pdf/127246.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5DR-3LME]. 
the yale law journal 128:254  2018 
314 
at low-income workers and because it does not tax and reduce employment.
228
 
Better yet, he has argued, would be a “universal lump-sum payment”—essen-
tially a guaranteed basic income—or “negative marginal tax rates” at low income 
levels.
229
 Others have argued for “wage subsidies” that low-wage workers re-
ceive with each paycheck instead of at the end of the tax year, and without the 
ﬁling requirements that keep many eligible workers from claiming the EITC.
230
 
In one way or another, all of these alternative strategies effectively separate the 
question of what workers need or deserve by way of income from the question 
of what their employers should be required to pay them. All of them increase 
incomes for low-wage workers and allow for the pursuit of legitimate redistrib-
utive aims without a counterproductive impact on employment. Any of them 
might also be combined with moderate increases in the minimum wage.
231
 
This argument is bound to rankle many worker advocates. It ﬂies in the face 
of what might seem to be a perfectly sensible normative premise that employers 
ought to pay whatever workers deserve to earn as a return on their labor—in-
deed, that tapping public funds to support the incomes of the poorest workers 
“provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers.”
232
 That nor-
mative claim is frequently backed by an empirical prediction that mandating 
higher wages would push ﬁrms toward more efficient and capital-intensive 
modes of production and the creation of better jobs—as indeed it did in the run-
up to World War II and its aftermath.
233
 It is at least plausible, however, to think 
that this time will be different, that job destruction will outrun job creation, and 
 
228. See Shaviro, supra note 169, at 459-66. Notably, the EITC covers “self-employed” workers 
who work as independent contractors. 26 U.S.C. § 32(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2018). The EITC does 
not now, but could, reﬂect local differences in the cost of living. David Callahan, Why Not Peg 
EITC Beneﬁts to the Local Cost of Living?, DEMOS (Mar. 9, 2014), https://www.demos.org/blog
/3/19/14/why-not-peg-eitc-beneﬁts-local-cost-living [https://perma.cc/T4K7-RYBK]. 
229. Shaviro, supra note 169, at 410. 
230. For an empirical assessment of some relatively narrow wage-subsidy programs, see Lawrence 
F. Katz, Wage Subsidies for the Disadvantaged (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 5679, 1996). For a more polemical endorsement from a business-friendly think tank, see 
The Case for a Targeted Living Wage Subsidy, EMP. POLICIES INST. (June 2001), https://www
.epionline.org/wp-content/studies/epi_livingwage_07-2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RUT 
-ME3H]. 
231. That is the position of Alan Krueger, a leading scholarly skeptic of the conventional economic 
wisdom regarding minimum wage increases. See Krueger, supra note 173 (“Although the 
plight of low-wage workers is a national tragedy, the push for a nationwide $15 minimum 
wage strikes me as a risk not worth taking, especially because other tools, such as the earned-
income tax credit, can be used in combination with a higher minimum wage to improve the 
livelihoods of low-wage workers.”). 
232. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937). 
233. See Marc Linder, The Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J. LEGIS. 151, 157-
58 (1990). 
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that large minimum wage increases will contribute to that process. If I am right 
in arguing that a slower pace of automation will better enable us to make the 
major social, political, and individual adjustments that will be required to meet 
the challenge of automation, then it makes sense to ﬁnd alternative ways to pay 
for part of what workers deserve to earn from their labor—even if it might look 
like a subsidy to employers. 
In short, to the extent that ﬁrms are increasingly able to boost proﬁts by 
shedding workers and automating work, their chronic complaints about the 
costs of employment mandates will have to be taken more seriously. Yet that 
need not entail shrinking workers’ entitlements; in some cases, we can and 
should instead shift the burden of paying for those entitlements away from the 
employment nexus. 
The unburdening strategy proposed here has an additional virtue that 
should appeal to those who see much to be gained from technological advances. 
The proposed strategy would have its greatest impact on the automation deci-
sions that should most concern us: those that mainly substitute for labor rather 
than complement labor, and those that are driven chieﬂy by labor costs rather than 
gains in quality, reliability, safety, or the like. Obviously, the same technology 
can both replace some workers and enhance others’ productivity, and can both 
save on labor costs and improve quality. But the more heavily labor costs weigh 
in ﬁrms’ automation decisions, the more those decisions will be affected by the 
unburdening of employment. Firms’ pursuit of other gains from automation—
such as increasing workers’ productivity, product quality, and reliability—will be 
left comparatively unaffected. 
D. Paying for Entitlements that Are Detached from Employment 
Thus far I have argued for maintaining or even expanding workers’ entitle-
ments, and for replacing the current mechanism for ﬁnancing them. That raises 
the obvious question, already touched on, of how to pay for those entitlements. 
Without wandering too far into the domain of tax policy and public ﬁnance, let 
us take up that question brieﬂy. 
The primary aim is to reduce the costs associated with hiring workers, and 
thus slow the ﬂight from human labor to machines. Insofar as we can shift those 
costs toward the top of the income scale, where the gains from automation are 
concentrated, then we can simultaneously address the distinct but related prob-
lem of rising income inequality. Automation has already contributed to the trou-
bling growth of economic inequality by increasing the returns to capital versus 
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labor, and is likely to continue to do so going forward.
234
 As such, it is increas-
ingly a moral and political imperative to ﬁnd ways to redistribute income from 
the winners in our highly polarized winner-take-all economy to those who have 
lost ground or are just scraping by. A reconﬁguration of the basic system for 
funding social entitlements opens the door to undertaking some much-needed 
redistribution. (On the political question of how to persuade more voters of the 
need for redistribution I will be even briefer here.) 
Redistribution can be achieved and inequality countered through policy de-
cisions on both the taxing side and the spending side of the public ledger.
235
 
More egalitarian European countries achieve redistribution less through a highly 
progressive tax structure than through larger public expenditures on behalf of 
those in need (and higher taxes overall). On the spending side, I have already 
argued for replacing employee entitlements with broader or universal beneﬁts 
such as affordable health care, generous paid family and medical leave and vaca-
tions, decent retirement income, and income support for poor workers. But the 
net redistributive impact of these programs, and the impact on economic in-
equality, would depend on how they are ﬁnanced—on the taxation side of the 
ledger. 
It is worth noting at the outset that the payroll tax, which now ﬁnances sev-
eral major employee entitlements, is arguably the single most regressive major 
source of tax revenues in the United States (and elsewhere).
236
 Shifting all or 
part of the cost of some worker entitlements from employers’ payrolls to a 
broader and more progressive tax base would mitigate both the incentive to au-
tomate and the growth of income inequality. 
Given the multiple goals here—funding social beneﬁts, achieving redistribu-
tion, and mitigating the incentive to automate—it might seem hard to resist the 
idea of a “robot tax,” proposed famously by Bill Gates and Elon Musk.
237
 On the 
 
234. See, e.g., Tyson & Spence, supra note 7, at 171. The problem is exacerbated by the U.S. tax code, 
which “subsidizes capital relative to labor.” Acemoglu & Restrepo, supra note 43, at 14; see also 
Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 119, at 150. 
235. See EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEND 
OUR MONEY, at xxi (2015). 
236. That is based on the standard assumption that the payroll tax mainly falls on workers them-
selves, and on the fact that the tax drops out at high income levels. As of 2018, only the ﬁrst 
$128,400 of income is subject to the tax. See Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determina-
tions for 2018, 82 Fed. Reg. 59937, 59939 (Dec. 15, 2017). If we relax the ﬁrst assumption, the 
payroll tax would be less regressive but more likely to discourage employment. 
237. See Kevin J. Delaney, The Robot that Takes Your Job Should Pay Taxes, Says Bill Gates, QUARTZ 
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-job-should-pay
-taxes [https://perma.cc/G3KD-WVX5]; see also Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 119; 
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face of it, such a tax could simultaneously slow down the replacement of people 
by robots, replace lost payroll-tax revenues as payrolls shrink, and promote eq-
uitable redistribution from those who make and own the robots to those whose 
jobs they are destroying or degrading. Presumably, like the tax on human labor, 
a robot tax would affect ﬁrms’ decisions only at the margin; size matters. But the 
basic concept might seem irresistible given all I have argued here. In some ways, 
a robot tax might look like a mirror image of my proposal to reduce the law’s tax 
on human labor (but without the attack on cherished and hard-fought labor 
gains). On the other hand, most economists scoff at the idea of a robot tax.
238
 
There is the challenge of identifying a “robot”—they do not all look like C-3PO 
or R2-D2 from Star Wars
239
—as well as the arbitrariness of targeting robots ver-
sus nonrobotic forms of automation.
240
 More importantly, however, they say 
that such a tax would depress (or drive overseas) any efficient and productive 
capital investments, along with the good jobs that accompany such invest-
ments.
241
 As a potential source of revenue to fund the entitlements that I propose 
to unlink from employment, it deserves consideration beyond what I can give it 
here. 
Perhaps the simplest way in the United States to achieve some redistribution 
of income and to pay for what are now employee entitlements is to increase the 
income tax and steepen its progressivity.
242
 We could, for example, couple a neg-
ative income tax for the poor with signiﬁcantly higher marginal tax rates at the 
 
Orly Masur, Taxing the Robots, 46 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com 
/abstract=3231660. 
238. See, e.g., Masur, supra note 237, at 19-25 (criticizing robot-tax proposals). 
239. Id. at 20-21. Proxies for a robot tax, such as a tax based on the ratio of proﬁts to number of 
employees, would avoid the problem of identifying robots, but it would exacerbate the prob-
lem of discouraging or driving away productivity-enhancing investments. 
240. Id. at 21-22. 
241. See Yanis Varoufakis, A Tax on Robots? Bill Gates’s Proposal for a “Robot Tax” Highlights Techno-
logical Risks to Jobs – and Also to the Income Tax Base, ACUITY, June-July 2017, at 35-36 (arguing 
that it would be functionally difficult to create a robot tax that does not expand to encompass 
all capital goods); James Bessen, Bill Gates Is Wrong that Robots and Automation Are Killing 
Jobs, FORTUNE (Feb. 25, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/25/bill-gates-robot-tax 
-automation-jobs [https://perma.cc/QU3B-46DZ] (arguing that a robot tax would inhibit 
innovation and slow job growth). That last argument might reﬂect assumptions about the 
overall net societal beneﬁts of automation that I have questioned here. It might also highlight 
the blunt impact of a tax on robots as compared to a reduction in the tax on human labor. As 
I have argued above, the latter tends to target the labor substitution and labor-cost-driven 
aspects of automation. 
242. Greater progressivity could be achieved in part by eliminating some highly regressive tax ex-
penditures including “around $100 billion of outright subsidies every year to various business 
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top of the income scale. One need not crunch the numbers to recognize that there 
is some income tax rate structure that could fully fund a set of universal social 
entitlements that would more than replace both the existing system of manda-
tory employee beneﬁts and sizeable increases in the minimum wage. 
There are alternatives, of course, such as a wealth tax,
243
 a tax on ﬁnancial 
transactions,
244
 or a European-style consumption tax.
245
 Each of these forms of 
taxation has advantages and disadvantages, all explored elsewhere.
246
 The im-
portant point here is that some combination of taxes on income, wealth, ﬁnancial 
transactions, and consumption would have two virtues over taxes on employ-
ment as a way to fund entitlements such as health insurance, paid leave, and 
supplemental income for poor workers. They would avoid hastening the substi-
tution of technological capital for labor and allow for some redistribution of in-
come. 
I want to emphasize that I am not proposing to dismantle the current system 
of employment-based beneﬁts, creaky and incomplete as it is, unless and until a 
sustainable system of more broadly socialized beneﬁts is at hand. Efforts to so-
cialize and subsidize what have long been employee beneﬁts will face stiff polit-
ical headwinds, including powerful antitax and antiredistributive impulses (even 
among some prospective beneﬁciaries).
247
 Those efforts will also inspire evasive 
maneuvers, such as transnational tax strategies by which ﬁrms or individuals can 
reduce their tax exposure by offshoring operations or income.
248
 The project 
 
interests—subsidies that never would pass muster as cash outlays.” KLEINBARD, supra note 
235, at 242. 
243. Thomas Piketty, for example, has proposed a global wealth tax as an antidote to rising in-
equality. See PIKETTY, supra note 30, at 515-39. 
244. See Leonard E. Burman et al., Financial Transaction Taxes in Theory and Practice, 69 NAT’L TAX 
J. 171 (2016). 
245. See Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 
112 YALE L.J. 261, 281-90 (2002). Consumption taxes tend to be regressive, but that could be 
offset either by other taxes or, on the spending side, by using increased revenues to fund re-
distributive programs. 
246. See generally KLEINBARD, supra note 235 (providing an overview of different forms of taxation 
and spending). 
247. On the politics of redistribution, see Gillian Lester, Can Joe the Plumber Support Redistribution? 
Law, Social Preferences, and Sustainable Policy Design, 64 TAX L. REV. 313 (2011); Gillian Lester, 
“Keep Government Out of My Medicare”: The Search for Popular Support of Taxes and Social 
Spending, in WORKING AND LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF ECONOMIC FRAGILITY 176 (Marion 
Crain & Michael Sherraden eds., 2014). 
248. The potential gamesmanship that can be set off by changes in the tax laws is illustrated (in 
the context of the Trump administration’s tax legislation) in an extraordinary report by thir-
teen leading tax law scholars. See David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: An Update on 
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outlined here aims to replace the existing employment-based social model, but 
not to undermine it in the meantime. 
E. A Broader Case for Reconstructing the Platform for Social Rights and Beneﬁts 
I am hardly the ﬁrst to call for a shift away from “employment” as the foun-
dation for allocating basic social entitlements. This Article’s argument echoes, 
for example, earlier scholarly responses to the disintegration of the standard em-
ployment relationship and the rise of various forms of contingent work and 
“self-employment.” Especially in the wake of Alain Supiot’s renowned 1999 re-
port to the European Commission,
249
 scholars in Europe and North America 
were moved to reconsider the continued viability of the contract of employment 
as what Brian Langille called “the ‘platform’ for delivering rights and bene-
ﬁts.”
250
 The erosion of the standard employment relationship and the rise of 
contingent work highlighted the need to extend those social entitlements be-
yond the “platform” of employment, and to expand the responsibilities of ﬁrms 
accordingly. 
Now the growing capabilities and falling costs of automation are highlight-
ing the need to extend basic entitlements, their funding, or both beyond the 
broader platform of paid work. Now, as then, the goal is at least two-pronged: 
ﬁrst, to extend crucial entitlements to those who are no longer (or perhaps never 
were) securely ensconced within stable employment relationships; and second, 
to preserve good jobs by countering ﬁrms’ incentive to replace employees with 
contractors or human workers with machines. 
This Article has focused on the latter virtue of untying some entitlements 
and their costs from employment. I do not want to overstate the impact on job 
preservation. The fairly modest recalibration of the legal burdens on employ-
ment of human labor proposed here—which aims to preserve or even expand 
the decent-work agenda—would only incrementally reduce ﬁrms’ incentive to 
offload workers. On the other hand, the unburdening strategy, unlike earlier 
proposals to expand both the beneﬁts and burdens of employment to other 
workers and work arrangements, would help to meet the challenge of ﬁssuring 
and the challenge of automation. It would extend crucial entitlements to those 
who no longer work within stable employment relationships, and it would re-
duce ﬁrms’ incentive to replace employees with either contractors or machines. 
 
the Conference Committee Tax Bill, 103 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com 
/abstract=3089423. 
249. The 1999 “Supiot Report” was later published in book form. SUPIOT, supra note 222. 
250. Fudge et al., supra note 177, at 331-32, 363 (quoting Brian Langille, Labour Policy in Canada—
New Platform, New Paradigm, 28 CANADIAN PUB. POL’Y 133 (2002)). 
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In sum, the strategy proposed here would promote both liberty and equality. 
On the side of liberty, it would better enable some individuals to choose the 
greater autonomy and ﬂexibility of self-employment or freelancing (even as it 
reduced ﬁrms’ incentive to use freelancers instead of employees). It is hard to 
credit the rosy depictions of the so-called sharing economy when so many of 
those who work in that economy would prefer to have a real job and the relative 
stability and beneﬁts that go with it.
251
 Yet freelance and platform-based work is 
not merely a sham or a last resort for those who cannot get a full-time job. Many 
individuals genuinely value the freedom from direct supervision and the ability 
to determine their own work schedule.
252
 Others would surely make that choice 
if they had a baseline level of economic security from which to do so. 
A stronger universal system of social provision would also promote equality 
in two senses. As sketched in this Article, it would redistribute some of the out-
sized gains at the top of the income distribution to those whose living standards 
have fallen or stagnated, and it would counter social stratiﬁcation between in-
siders—relatively privileged and well-provisioned employees of leading ﬁrms—
and outsiders who are left to their own devices (or to a social safety net that is 
politically vulnerable because of its narrow focus on the poor). 
The prevailing strategy of shoring up the fortress of employment, however 
successful, will still leave out a large and probably growing segment of the adult 
population, along with their dependents. Detached from economically capable 
and comparatively responsible lead ﬁrms, those individuals may work for less 
proﬁtable and compliant contractor ﬁrms, or as independent contractors, free-
lancers, and temps. Or they may be unable to ﬁnd steady paid work at all. A 
stronger set of basic social entitlements would help to ensure that those individ-
uals and their children enjoy the foundations of a decent and healthy life even if 
they cannot enter the fortress of full-time stable employment. 
F. Some Objections and Alternatives 
I have argued that a shift away from employment as the platform for entitle-
ments and their funding, and toward more universal social entitlements and 
broader-based funding, would serve multiple goals. But the strategy of unbur-
dening employment—even along the circumspect lines proposed here—will 
meet resistance from those who seek instead to fortify the existing model of 
worker rights and entitlements and employer responsibilities—to shore up the 
 
251. MGI, Study on Independent Work, supra note 127, at 1, 7. 
252. Id. 
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fortress of employment. As suggested above, some of the resistance to unbur-
dening employment reﬂects a premise, explicit or implicit, that employers deserve 
to bear the burden of whatever rights and entitlements workers deserve to have, 
including the basic material requisites of a decent life for oneself and one’s de-
pendents.
253
 I share that intuition, but I have come to question it. As it becomes 
easier for employers to escape those burdens—partially through ﬁssuring or al-
together through automation—the premise begins to look self-defeating. 
Other objections to the unburdening strategy are more pragmatic. One, also 
foreshadowed above, harkens back to the economists’ mantra of creative destruc-
tion: even if high labor standards would destroy some jobs, they will also help 
to generate new and better jobs. As Marc Linder has shown, some New Deal 
proponents of early minimum wage laws similarly viewed the tendency to dis-
place some workers and to promote more capital-intensive modes of production 
as a feature, not a bug, of those laws.
254
 As a result, both consumer demand and 
displaced workers would ﬂow toward more efficient (and capital intensive) pro-
ducers who could afford to pay higher wages.
255
 But if this time really is differ-
ent, such that machines will be able to produce an ever-larger share of the prod-
ucts and services that humans demand in the future, then we have more to worry 
about than the New Dealers did.
256
 
Another argument for shoring up the fortress of employment, and against 
the unburdening strategy, is more fatalistic. Net job losses due to automation are 
inevitable, and will not be much affected by reducing the costs of employees’ 
legal rights, beneﬁts, and protections. Those costs obviously matter only at the 
margin in ﬁrms’ decisions about automation; and cutting them back would only 
marginally slow down the loss of jobs while undermining the quality and work-
ing conditions in the jobs that remain. There is much to be said for this response. 
To be sure, people will not win a “race against the machines” on cost grounds, 
and they should not try to do so. Still, as I have argued above, the pace of auto-
mation matters a lot. The faster jobs are automated, the less time people will 
have to acquire the skills needed in a more tech-infused economy; and the less 
time we as a society will have to devise, build support for, and implement sensi-
ble legal and institutional responses to automation. 
 
253. It might resonate, too, with a fulsome conception of the total cost of reproducing labor, the 
burden of which should arguably fall on those who use labor. 
254. See Linder, supra note 233, at 152-56. 
255. This was not just left to the “invisible hand” of the market; public investments in training, 
transition, assistance, and job creation were also part of the New Deal program, and of the 
recovery. See infra note 258. 
256. On the other hand, those who yearn for a postwork future might push for higher wages and 
labor standards precisely because of their tendency to accelerate automation. For an example, 
see SRNICEK & WILLIAMS, supra note 100, at 105. 
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Underlying the last two defenses of the fortress strategy are conﬂicting pre-
dictions about the future impact of automation on jobs—one that is skeptical of 
the prospect of job losses and one that is resigned to them. That reminds us again 
of the uncertainties and contingencies that cloud our labor-market forecast and 
cast doubt on a broadly deregulatory response to fears of automation-induced 
job losses. Yet all of these arguments together do not dispel the concern that 
labor and employment laws, and their attendant costs, are contributing in some 
measure to the speed and extent of job losses. I have argued that it is possible to 
counter that impact while protecting workers’ rights and interests, and at the 
same time to begin constructing a stronger and more inclusive foundation for 
the more varied working lives that are likely in the labor markets of the future. 
Some who oppose the unburdening strategy proposed here would point to 
alternative strategies for spreading the beneﬁts and mitigating the costs of auto-
mation. Most such alternatives fall into four categories. First, investments in job 
training; second, investments in job creation; third, new forms of guaranteed 
income support, such as a UBI or a negative income tax; and fourth, job sharing 
through reduced hours and weeks of work.
257
 This is not the place to thoroughly 
evaluate all of these alternative strategies, although some of them overlap with 
the proposals I have made here. But I do not believe that these alternative strat-
egies undermine this Article’s basic case for shifting some of the entitlements 
and burdens that are currently linked to employment to a broader set of beneﬁ-
ciaries and a broader funding base. 
There is no doubt that we need better institutions of basic and higher edu-
cation and of vocational training and retraining to equip more people for the 
technology-adjacent jobs that are likely to grow in the future, and to allow more 
people to reap the economic gains that automation will produce.
258
 But it will 
 
257. In addition, Richard Freeman and colleagues have proposed that, in view of the long-term 
and seemingly inexorable decline in economic returns to labor versus capital, workers should 
gain an ownership share in technological capital—perhaps in the form of employee stock own-
ership—from which they might derive part of their income. See JOSEPH R. BLASI, RICHARD B. 
FREEMAN & DOUGLAS L. KRUSE, THE CITIZEN’S SHARE: REDUCING INEQUALITY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2014); Freeman, supra note 7, at 1. 
258. Notably, the MGI report urges measures like these. See MGI, Jobs Lost, Jobs Gained, supra note 
70, at 106-14. The New Dealers who embraced the tendency of higher labor standards to de-
stroy some jobs also urged the adoption of an “active manpower policy,” including invest-
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take time—even if it is possible—to devise and implement education and train-
ing programs that could enable those displaced from more routine jobs to move 
into higher-skilled jobs. Again, the speed of job destruction matters. 
Public job creation, including the newly resurgent idea of a federal job guar-
antee, would have a number of beneﬁts. In particular, investments in physical 
infrastructure, education, and other public goods, and in social services for peo-
ple—especially young, old, and disabled people—who cannot afford to buy the 
services they need in the market, would both create jobs and meet societal 
needs.
259
 A program of national service—voluntary or even compulsory—would 
do both of those things and perhaps more.
260
 I do not think, however, that those 
investments would obviate the need to unburden employment by recalibrating 
employment mandates, beneﬁts, and liabilities. For one thing, the faster job de-
struction takes place in the private sector, the harder it will be for public job cre-
ation to take up the slack. Moreover, public job creation will not address the 
growing coverage gap that arises from ﬁssuring and the proliferation of inde-
pendent work outside of the employment nexus; nor will it serve the liberty in-
terests that a more universal system of social beneﬁts would advance. Public job 
creation should supplement, not substitute for, the strategy proposed here. 
Proposals for universal income support, and especially the idea of a UBI, are 
gaining renewed attention as fears of automation-related job losses spread. It is 
striking that former trade-union leader Andy Stern emerged from a deep dive 
into the impact of technology on the future of work as a proselytizer for a UBI 
to cushion the impact of massive job losses due to automation.
261
 A UBI or some 
similar measure would help people to weather (or choose) breaks or shortfalls 
in paid employment, or to choose independent work beyond employment, and 
it could redistribute some of the gains from automation from the economic win-
ners to the losers. The case for a UBI is hotly contested, but it will undoubtedly 
gain strength and adherents if job losses begin to mount; and it is not incompat-
ible with the strategy proposed here. But unless new income entitlements also 
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replace or reduce the burden of employer mandates, they would not have the job 
preservation beneﬁts of the strategy I have proposed. Any move to supplement 
wage-based income should be designed to slow as well as to cushion job losses. 
A ﬁnal alternative strategy would press for a reduction in working hours—
both fewer hours per week and fewer weeks per year. For the better part of the 
century leading up to the New Deal, organized labor campaigned tirelessly to 
reduce the workweek while maintaining compensation levels.
262
 More recently, 
Matthew Dimick has sought to revive the argument for tighter regulation of 
working hours as a way to more equitably spread both work and leisure.
263
 Like 
the UBI, proposals to reduce hours—as well as proposals to expand access to 
paid leave and vacations—will gain support if we begin to see an overall decline 
in the amount of paid work in the economy. Yet the virtues of this proposal do 
not include work preservation. Tighter regulation of hours—whether in the 
form of an hours cap or an overtime premium—would likely raise the hourly cost 
of labor and strengthen the case for automation.
264
 That would be especially true 
if shorter hours are to be achieved without lowering incomes, as past labor cam-
paigns for shorter hours sought to do. 
In short, all of these alternatives—job training, job creation, income support, 
and reduced work time—have much to be said for them, and much more than I 
can say here. An ideal policy response to the prospect of job destruction through 
automation would probably combine elements from all four of those categories. 
I do think it is worth devising an ideal response—even if it is hard in the current 
environment to envision the political path that would lead there. Indeed, those 
daunting political challenges underscore the wisdom—whatever the other re-
sponses to automation-related job losses—of slowing the pace of job destruction 
by unburdening employment and building a new and broader platform for social 
beneﬁts that are currently delivered through employment. 
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conclusion 
The claim that machines will make human labor obsolete is overstated and 
often stated. It is a refrain that has surfaced periodically—often with the adden-
dum that “this time is different”—only to be buried by the next wave of economic 
growth. History is largely on the side of those enthusiasts of innovation and 
markets who reject predictions of a jobless future. And yet sometimes the future 
really is different from the past. Consider Malthus: at the close of the eighteenth 
century, he extrapolated from centuries of stagnant productivity to predict that 
a growing population would inevitably outstrip society’s nearly ﬁxed food sup-
ply,
265
 only to be proven spectacularly wrong by the Industrial Revolution.
266
 
We might now face a future of shrinking employment opportunities and fall-
ing wages for workers whose skills are being replicated or surpassed by ever-
smarter and more cost-effective machines. Given current social and economic 
arrangements, that is a devastating prospect for the vast majority of people in 
our society who depend on paid work for their livelihood and the material sup-
port of their dependents. And it is a profoundly unsettling prospect for a society 
in which so many dimensions of personal identity, social integration, and civil 
society—as well as economic security—are intertwined with paid work. For now 
and for the near future, decent work for those who want and need it—whether 
it is within or beyond the employment relationship—remains a worthy aspira-
tion. 
For some scholars, automation’s threat to the future of work, and especially 
the technological destruction of middle-class jobs, is more profound than I have 
admitted. It may be precipitating the end of capitalism as we know it.
267
 If that 
is so, then we should begin to grapple with the daunting challenge of building 
the foundations of a new political economy that is not centered on private proﬁts 
and paid work. That challenge will loom larger if the facts on the ground begin 
to point decisively toward shrinking demand for human labor. But in the current 
context of uncertainty and intense debate about the future impact of automation 
on labor markets, the strategy proposed here can preserve jobs, or slow their loss, 
while simultaneously laying the foundations for a future of much less work. 
There is a certain irony in the almost-romantic attachment of some contem-
porary worker advocates to the standard employment relationship, with its sig-
nature features of worker dependency and managerial domination. In the early 
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decades of industrialization, skilled artisans fought desperately to retain their 
autonomy, resisting the subordination and dependency that came with what 
they called “wage slavery.”
268
 Eventually most workers and their organizations 
resigned themselves to the subordinate role of employee, and fought for its refor-
mation through an array of rights, minimum labor standards, and structures for 
collective representation—all to the end of transforming “wage slavery” into a 
decent way of economic life for ordinary workers. Yet the standard employment 
relationship, thus civilized, is hardly an ideal to defend at all costs. And in any 
case, it is now crumbling. 
Through ﬁssuring and automation, ﬁrms are increasingly ﬁnding ways to 
escape their end of the socially constructed deal embodied in the standard em-
ployment relationship. A growing number of workers are either ﬂeeing or being 
ejected from both the constraints and the protections of that relationship. Shor-
ing up and expanding the fortress of employment will not prevent that exodus. 
We do need to improve and enforce employee rights and labor standards—those 
that embody evolving norms of decent work and that are necessarily tied to em-
ployment and employer practices. But we also need to furnish the growing do-
main that lies beyond employment with the basic material requisites of a decent 
life for those who choose a more independent economic existence and for those 
who cannot get into the fortress. 
In his prescient 1999 report to the European Commission, Alain Supiot ob-
served that “the employee subject to full-time, open-ended subordination is 
surely not the only model for working life. Another ﬁgure can be discerned on 
the horizon: a worker who can reconcile security and freedom.”
269
 Perhaps the 
real, if sometimes exaggerated, threat of automation-based job losses will supply 
the motivation we need to move toward a new social model—one that reconciles 
security and freedom, that supports many modes of working life, and that works 
better for all of those who work for a living. 
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